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“The Egyptian people 
Are fighting valiantly 
For human rights. 
 
The Israeli Knesset 
Is fighting valiantly 
To abolish 
Human rights”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recognition of Palestinian statehood has now become an important 
issue in the evolution of the conflict between the state of Israel and the 
Palestinian people.  The issue has been made more interesting by decisions 
of the Canadian Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).2  
In particular, this Article refers to the judgment of the ICJ concerning the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo.3  This judgment adds 
insights to the prospect of a Palestinian claim to statehood and independence 
from an international law perspective.  More generally, 2010 culminated in 
the widespread perception that Israel’s leaders seek to maintain the status 
quo indefinitely, leaving Palestinians as an occupied people, which 
ostensibly secures Israeli interests.4  If true, such a position is contrary to 
Israel’s international legal obligations and places Palestinian aspirations at 
heightened risk.5  As the Palestinians’ representatives began seeking support 
for international recognition for the state of Palestine, Israel reached out to 
other countries—most significantly, the United States—to block such a 
move.6  On December 15, 2010 the United States Congress passed a 
resolution condemning acts by the Palestinians to seek unilateral (meaning 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Uri Avnery, There and Here, HAARETZ GUSH SHALOM, Feb. 18, 2011. 
 2 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) (ruling on Quebec’s 
attempt to secede under international law); Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 
141 (July 22) (ruling on the legality of the Declaration of Independence issued by Kosovo). 
 3 Dapo Akande, ICJ Finds that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence Not in Violation of 
International Law, EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. BLOG (July 23, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/icj-fin 
ds-that-kosovos-declaration-of-independence-not-in-violation-of-international-law. 
 4 Lexington, Israel and America Obama in the Middle, ECONOMIST (May 25, 2011), http:// 
www.economist.com/blogs/Lexington/2011/05/isreal_and_america. 
 5 Andrew Hammond, Israel Must Meet International Obligations: Fayyad, REUTERS (Feb. 
11, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/11/us-israel-elections-fayyad-sb-idUSTRE51 
A2RT20090211.  
 6 Mark Perry & Ali Abunimah, The US Role as Israel’s Enabler, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 26, 
2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112614122782761.html%3E. 
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without the permission of Israel) recognition of the state of Palestine.7  
Recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggest that a 
clarification of international law standards regarding new states, as well the 
issue of recognition of Palestinian statehood, is ripe for analysis. 
State recognition is widely perceived to be a political fact with legal 
consequences.8  In the real world context of state recognition, the legal 
aspect actually reflects the circumstances of the proto-state (including its 
political background), making the distinction between political fact and legal 
consequence less clear.9  Analyzing the prospects for any proto-state requires 
the serious consideration of international law processes—the clarification of 
which may guide the development of outcomes in particular cases.  The 
contemplated transition in proto-Palestine is one such case. 
Many more international law issues other than mere state recognition are 
implicated in an effort to establish a sustainable solution to this longstanding 
conflict. The international law jurisdiction over the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is exceedingly complex.10  Frequently, there is a contest between 
apparently settled international law standards and the brute facts of either 
denial or noncompliance—a challenge to the role of international law to 
effectively provide appropriate normative guidance to the parties.11  
Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one that generates dynamism of 
facts.  Since new facts are generated continuously, those facts redefine 
contextual reality and, as changed contexts emerge, the contextual 
background itself is redefined.  This implies that new facts reshape the legal 
framework and the relevant discourse.  Nevertheless, the complexity 
attending the normative salience of international law and the context of brute 
power relations can be unpacked through configurative legal analysis, which 
uses the legal process as a tool for clarifying problems (rather than narrowly 
demanding prescriptive outcomes).  Using configurative analysis, this 
presentation envelopes the necessary contextual background within which 
                                                                                                                   
 7 H.R. Res. 1765, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted). 
 8 Philip Marshall Brown, Editorial Comment, The Legal Effects of Recognition, 44 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 617, 617 (1950). 
 9 Bridget L. Coggins, Secession, Recognition & the International Politics of Statehood, at 44 
(2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (available at http://etd.ohiolink. 
edu/view.cgi/Coggins%20Bridget%20L.pdf?acc_num=osu1154013298). 
 10 See Weizmann-Feisal Agreement, World Zionist Org.-Arab Kingdom of Hedjaz, Jan. 3, 
1919 (agreeing to look into the possibilities of an Arab state, later repudiated); Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (“Oslo Agreement”), Sept. 13, 1993 
(agreeing to commence negotiations on the permanent status of the disputed land in Gaza and 
Jericho). 
 11 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393–94 (Robert Tucker ed., 2d ed. 
1966). 
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the contestations of international law norms and the search for satisfactory 
conclusions are important. 
International law functions not only by declaring the operative rules and 
principles that form its procedural and substantive background, but also (as 
an epistemological tool) by reframing the search for relevant facts having 
important legal effects.12  In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
both sides contest the contextual reality and, consequently, the urgency of 
addressing particular factual and legal issues.  The unwillingness of the 
parties (through their constituted leadership) to confront legitimate issues of 
coexistence corresponds with a prevalent ambivalence toward legal norms 
that direct effective solutions.  An appropriate approach to international law 
may permit us to better identify and understand problems that ultimately 
require solutions consistent with an evolving legal and political reality.  
This Article focuses on one aspect of a complex context of claims and 
counterclaims by the Israeli and Palestinian peoples: the status of Palestinian 
claims to statehood under international law.  These claims have been variously 
contested by the Israeli authorities as well as members of the international 
community.  We aim to explore the precise legal and political grounds for 
these claims and contestations, in order to arrive at a contextual reality that will 
permit the Israelis and Palestinians to move forward in the process of arriving 
at a fair and settled agreement.  This status is necessary for individuals to begin 
to accept the status quo and build upon these foundations with activities that 
will enrich the region and the lives of its people. 
From the onset, we wish to point out that we assign a positive value 
judgment to both perspectives; pro-Israel and pro-Palestine.  From this 
perspective we have tried to provide an objective appraisal of the claim of 
Palestinians to independence and statehood.  We have tried to take into 
account the interest of the most prominent stakeholders.  We have come to 
the conclusion that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is in the common 
interest of all the parties and more generally of the world community.  This 
Article therefore, suggests appropriate international law strategies to 
expeditiously secure the international recognition of statehood for the 
Palestinian community.        
The plan of this Article is to provide the background facts important to 
the respective claims of both the Israelis and the Palestinians.  In particular, 
the Palestinian claim rests on the boundaries recognized by the Security 
Council.  Israeli claims, which are not clearly delineated, are probably 
                                                                                                                   
 12 See Andrew F. Sunter, TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry, 20 CAN. J.L. & 
JURIS. 475 (2007) (describing Third World Approaches to International Law as an 
epistemological study).  
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influenced by the historical claim to Israeli boundaries reflected in the Eretz 
Israel idea.  The Article reviews Israeli statehood recognition and places the 
Palestinian issue in the context of the League of Nations Mandate System 
and the United Nations.  The Article traces the conflict following partition 
and reviews the issue of Palestinian statehood in terms of mandate 
expectations as well as contemporary expectations of international law.  
Guidance is sought from recent case law concerning the claims relating to 
Quebec and Kosovo.  The Article also reviews the problems of Israeli 
occupancy and their effect on Palestinian rights and international relations.  
The Article also seeks to clarify, as objectively as possible, the United 
States’ national interests in an expeditious solution to the conflict between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians.  On the basis of the policy clarifications of 
the respective interests, we provide a provisional conclusion which favors the 
recognition of Palestinian self-determination, statehood, and sovereignty.  
The penultimate part of the Article examines the interests of the Palestinians 
in the achievement of a two-State solution to advance peace in the region.  
The Article also seeks to clarify the possible Israeli interests in securing a 
two-State solution to advance the settlement of problems in the region.  
Finally, the last part of the Article reviews the strategic options that the 
Palestinians might employ in seeking to advance the claims to sovereignty, 
self-determination and statehood. 
II.  BACKGROUND FACTS RELEVANT TO THE CLAIMS FOR PALESTINIAN 
STATEHOOD 
A. The Land and People of Palestine and Eretz Israel 
Prior to the British conquest and the assumption of the Palestine Mandate 
responsibilities, the territory was part of the Ottoman Empire.  That Empire 
(although multiethnic) incorporated territories and populations of the Middle 
East that were largely—from a cultural point of view—Arabic.13  Recent 
history of Palestine shows how Palestine has been under the control of 
various external forces; first subject to the force of invading conquerors and 
then the paternalistic caprice of colonial rule.14  Prior to WWII, the 
Palestinian territories were an international mandate under the authority of 
the League of Nations.15  Britain, which had conquered an occupied territory 
                                                                                                                   
 13 Mim Kemal Oke, The Ottoman Empire, Zionism and the Question of Palestine, 14 INT’L 
J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 329, 330 (1982). 
 14 See NICHOLAS BETHELL, THE PALESTINE TRIANGLE: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE BRITISH, 
THE JEWS, AND THE ARABS, 1935–48 (1979) (discussing the recent occupiers of the territory). 
 15 See Council of the League of Nations, League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, July 24, 
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and displaced the Ottoman Empire, was granted the mandate to administer 
Palestine.16  This reflected the political reality that conquerors could retain 
their conquests subject to a weak form of international concern under the 
League’s mandate system.  One of the obligations of the mandatory power 
was to secure the well-being and interests of the people under its control and 
authority.  Making this international obligation more complex, Great 
Britain’s Balfour Declaration—articulated in 1917 prior to the end of the 
war—asserted British sympathies for Zionist ambitions in the Palestinian 
territories for Jewish immigration and settlement.17  In this sense, the 
Declaration was probably not consistent with the mandatory obligations of a 
Class A Mandate.  British practices, which allowed significant Jewish 
immigration, had the consequence of creating a critical Jewish presence in 
Palestine, which eventually shaped future events.18  What is most salient 
during this period of recent history is the lack of promotion of self-
determination for the Palestinian residents by the UK.19  
The defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the WWI meant that the 
conquering power had acquired temporary dominium over Palestine by 
conquest.  The peace process created a new international institution, the 
League of Nations.20  Under the Charter of the League a dispensation was 
made that the territories conquered by the conquerors would remain under 
their control, subject to a legal regime called the League of Nations Mandate 
System.21  The conquerors could keep the conquests, but mandate obligations 
required them to administer these territories in the interest of the inhabitants.22  
Palestine was a Class A mandate.23  This Class A mandate was somewhat 
                                                                                                                   
1922, http://cojs.org/cojswiki/League_of_Nations_Mandate_for_Palestine%2C_July_24%2C_19 
22 (entrusting the administration of the territory of Palestine to Great Britain). 
 16 Stefan Brooks, British Mandate for Palestine, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
CONFLICT: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 770 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2008). 
 17 See generally JONATHAN SCHNEER, THE BALFOUR DECLARATION: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT (2010) (explaining the history of Britain’s Balfour Declaration). 
 18 See Avi Shlaim, The Balfour Declaration And its consequences, in YET MORE 
ADVENTURES WITH BRITANNIA: PERSONALITIES, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN BRITAIN 251–70 
(Wm. Roger Louis ed., 2005). 
 19 See EDWARD W. SAID, THE POLITICS OF DISPOSSESSION: THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN 
SELF-DETERMINATION, 1969–1994 (1995) (explaining the Palestinians struggle for statehood 
through twenty-five years of exile). 
 20 See generally F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES, 1920–
1946 (1986) (describing the history of League of Nations and the United Nations. 
 21 See Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as 
Origin of Trusteeship, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 47, 47–95 (2005).  
 22 Id. at 72. 
 23 But see Eli E. Hertz, “Mandate for Palestine”: The Legal Aspects of Jewish Right, http:// 
www.mythsandfacts.org/conflict/mandate_for_palestine/mandate_for_palestine.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2012) (arguing that Palestine was never a Class A mandate). 
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distinctive in the sense that it contained a cláusula that was not expressed in 
Article 22 of the League Covenant.  This cláusula involved the encouragement 
of Jewish immigration for the establishment of a natural home for the Jews 
who were a minority in Palestine.24  There was an ostensible incompatibility 
between the British Balfour Declaration for promoting immigration to 
Palestine and the requirements of Article 22.  According to Balfour: 
The contradiction between the letters of the Covenant and the 
policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the 
“independent nation” of Palestine than in that of “independent 
nation” of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go 
through the form of consulting the wishes of the present 
inhabitants of the country . . . .25 
Balfour was very explicit about the problem of assuming mandate 
responsibility and the British commitment regarding Jewish immigration.  
Corresponding with Prime Minister Lloyd in 1919, George Balfour wrote 
“[t]he weak point of their mutually agreed position was that in Palestine we 
deliberately and rightly declined to accept the principal of self-
determination.”26  He stressed that the position of Jews outside of Palestine 
was a matter of global importance and added that he believed that Jews had a 
historic claim to a home in their ancient land.27  Thus, there was the mandate 
of Palestine administered by Great Britain, which had incompatible 
objectives that were never clearly put on the table so as to rationally 
reconcile them with the precise terms of the mandate’s international 
obligations.  The mandate’s central normative obligation was to exercise the 
mandate in the interest of the local inhabitants.28  There is abundant evidence 
that the constitutional position of Palestine was as a proto-state.29  In short, 
Britain, the mandatory power, was never recognized as exercising sovereign 
authority over Palestine.  There is a strong view among juris consults that the 
locus of authority in ‘Class A’ mandate Territories was vested in the 
population of the territories themselves.30  Indeed, for a multitude of 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Mark Rosenblit, International Law and the Jewish People’s Collective Rights of Settlement 
and Self-Determination in the Land of Israel, http://www.rosenblit.com/Law.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2012).  
 25 JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST CONFLICT 75 (2010).       
 26 A.P. THORNTON, IMPERIALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 123 (1977).  
 27 QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 75. 
 28 Hertz, supra note 23. 
 29 QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 75. 
 30 See Yoram Rabin & Roy Peled, Transfer of Sovereignty Over Populated Territories From 
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purposes Palestine was viewed as a State.  A Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concession’s Case31 
clearly regarded Palestine as a State.32 
The general conclusion that we might draw from the British administered 
Palestinian Mandate is that unlike the mandates in Syria and Iraq, there was 
no progression of indigenous self-determination to statehood.33  However, 
there is considerable consensus in scholarship and practice that Palestine was 
a proto-state and that its latent sovereignty was rooted in the Palestinian 
inhabitants of the territory.34  Attributes of sovereignty were residing in the 
body politic and the Mandate administration.35  The fact that statehood was 
not achieved for the Palestinians could be found in Great Britain’s 
commitment to the Balfour Declaration for the creation of a homeland for the 
Jewish diaspora which would occupy the boundaries of the ancient state of 
Israel.  The United Kingdom was therefore in a profound decisional 
dilemma: fulfilling the mandate obligations repudiated by Balfour and 
realizing that Balfour declaration promises repudiated the mandate.  This was 
a dilemma that has not yet been resolved.  Perhaps the British foreign office 
version of “Foggy Bottom”36 considered that it could simply muddle along in 
the hope that its convenient conclusion might somehow present itself. 
B.  The Recognition of the State of Israel 
When Britain, the mandatory power, requested in 1947 that the United 
Nations consider the future dispensation for the territory defined within the 
Palestinian Mandate, the U.N. General Assembly created a special 
committee to investigate the international legal status of the Palestinian 
territory.37  The committee determined that the British Mandate should be 
terminated and that independence should be granted to Palestine at the 
                                                                                                                   
Israel to a Palestinian State: The International Law Perspective, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 59 (2008) 
(exploring the concept of the transfer of sovereignty over territories from Israel to Palestine in 
the context of International law). 
 31 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3 (Aug. 30). 
 32 QUIGLEY, supra note 25, at 59. 
 33 See Jeff J. Corntassel & Tomas Hopkins Primeau, Indigenous “Sovereignty” and 
International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing “Self-Determination,” 17 HUMAN RTS. Q. 
343 (1995) (arguing that efforts towards indigenous sovereignty merely increase tensions 
between indigenous peoples and states). 
 34 Comm. on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Rep. on the 
International Status of the Palestinian People (Jan. 1, 1980).  
 35 Id.  
 36 WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 256 (2008).  Foggy Bottom is the 
nickname for the headquarters of the United States Department of State.   
 37 G.A. Res. 106(S-1), para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/106(S-I) (May 15, 1947).  
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earliest possible time.38  Despite the recommendation of “independence” and 
the committee’s majority view that Palestine was to be partitioned into an 
Arab state and a Jewish state, the committee stipulated that the territory’s 
Arab and Jewish communities were to be linked in an economic 
association.39  The status of Jerusalem, it was recommended, should be a 
separate entity under international supervision.40  The U.N. General 
Assembly, after lengthy debate, decided with more than 2/3 of a majority to 
accept the partition recommendations.  The U.N. General Assembly decision 
came in the form of Resolution 181, November 1947.41  Of particular 
importance is paragraph 3 of Resolution 181, which provides: 
Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special 
International Regime for the City of Jerusalem . . . shall come 
into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of 
the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed 
but in any case not later than 1 October 1948.  The boundaries 
of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem 
shall be as described in Parts II and III below.42 
 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Rep. to GOAR, U.N. Spec. Comm. on Palestine 2d Sess., Sept. 3, 1947, para. 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/364 (1947).  
 39 Id.  
 40 Id.  
 41 G.A. Res. 181(II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947). 
 42 Id. at I(A), para. 3.  
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Of particular interest are the terms indicating that two states “shall come 
into existence” after the termination of the Mandate.43  This seems to suggest 
that, by decision of the U.N. General Assembly, there is a legal expectation 
that the two communities within the territorial space of Palestine shall, 
according to the boundary delimitations of partition, establish sovereign 
states under the authority of the U.N. Charter.  This is probably an unusual 
approach to either the creation or recognition of an entity with sovereign 
status under international law.44  The conventional approach would start with 
a community acting as a people and with discernible leadership and 
representation expressing a claim to self-determination and independence.45  
This claim may then be further supported by facts relating to the expression 
of territorial control, or some dimensions thereof, as well as organized 
political authority sufficient to give coherence to the claim for self-
determination and independence.46  This claim would be followed by a 
degree of structured organization of the authority components of the 
claimants so that the elements of basic governance within such a context are 
discernible.47  Sometimes such an internally-created entity will initiate the 
development of a future transitional or tentative framework of constitutional 
governance which would be the factual precondition that should result in a 
declaration of independent statehood.48  
In a sense, Resolution 181 seems to have influenced the Jewish 
community in the partitioned part of Palestine to declare on May 14, 1948 
the existence of the state of Israel.49  This declaration was followed by other 
sovereign states bilaterally recognizing the state of Israel as a sovereign 
nation-state.50  This indicates that the declaration not only met certain factual 
preconditions, but also that those preconditions proceeded from the 
expectation in Resolution 181 that each community would establish the 
preconditions for a declaration of statehood.  In this sense, the Israeli 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Id.  
 44 See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2006) (describing the broad treatment of statehood, particularly in relation to Israel and 
Palestine). 
 45 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 3, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
 46 Id. art. 3. 
 47 Id. arts. 4–10. 
 48 Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 544–45 (1998). 
 49 The Declaration Of The Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948, ISRAEL 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Gui 
de%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%2
0of%20Israel.  
 50 Id. (stating recognition by the United States the night of and by the USSR three days after).   
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declaration was preceded by the General Assembly decision, which 
established the territorial contours of the state of Israel in terms of the 
partition resolution.  Moreover, the Resolution gave a quasi-judicial 
imprimatur that the international community expected communities within 
the partitioned territories to seize the opportunity for declaring statehood.  It 
therefore would seem to be rare that the creation of a state and a declaration 
by its people are preceded by a legal fact creating some factual conditions 
and suggesting that there is an expectation that, from these factual 
conditions, the community will seize upon the legal “green light” of 
statehood.  Usually, the entity establishes core minimum facts regarding its 
claim to statehood and then seeks recognition from an organization like the 
U.N. that it is entitled to recognition as a sovereign state.51  
C.  Palestine Mandate and United Nations System  
By 1948, Britain had had enough of the internal unrest and acts of 
terrorism directed at British forces by Zionist militias in Palestine, and 
therefore ceded to the United Nations the mandate and attendant 
responsibilities.52  Within the United Nations, a resolution was generated that 
partitioned Palestine for the establishment of a Jewish state (57% of the land) 
and for an Arab state (43% of the land).53   U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions are in general not legally binding, although they suggest that they 
are, as a matter of good faith, politically binding.54  In any event, it was the 
expectation of the target audience that the partition lines constituted a legally 
binding definition of respective territorial claims.  In addition, the Resolution 
does not declare the existence of two states.  Rather, it declares that the 
territorial partition is expected to constitute the boundaries of a Jewish and 
Arab state, subject to further conditions.  This critical junction theoretically 
permitted the removal of the colonial power and ostensibly transferred 
                                                                                                                   
 51 See generally Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its 
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403 (1999) (discussing different theories of 
establishing statehood). 
 52 A Summary of Zionist Terrorism in the Near East, 1944–1948; THE FRENCH CONNECTION 
(Oct. 1, 1948), http://iamthewitness.com/doc/Bunche.Report.on.Zionist.Terrorism.in.the.Near. 
East.htm. 
 53 G.A. Res. 181(II), supra note 41; Zaha Hassan, The Palestinian Constitution and the 
Geneva Accord: The Prospects for Palestinian Constitutionalism, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 897, 902 
(2004). 
 54 Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in 
Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876, 
899 n.90 (1983). 
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control to the U.N., which sanctioned the occupancy of Palestinian territories 
by growing numbers of Jewish immigrants.55 
To a large extent, the new Jewish settlers were refugees from elsewhere,56 
but they also staked their claim to Palestinian lands based on a “right of 
return,” which is considered by many Jews their biblical and historical 
birthright.57  For the resident Palestinians, it was likely overwhelming and 
threatening to see such an influx of outsiders claiming the best pieces of land 
and to have no control over the immigration, taxation, and property policies 
that gave preference to the Jewish settlers.  More challenging to the 
indigenous Palestinian population may have been the claim that these 
settlers, many of whom had never set foot in Palestine, claimed a superior 
heritage to the land.58  Nevertheless, Jewish culture—shaped in many ways 
by the exile from Palestine and the recurring experiences of extreme 
marginality and persecution from majority cultures everywhere—solidified 
around the identity of a community united in the Diaspora and destined to 
return.59  Arguably, it was this strength of identity—tied to a geographic 
location—that permitted the Jewish settlers to assert and achieve independent 
statehood after the Partition in 1948, when the Palestinian residents could 
not.  
The Partition Resolution prescribed the creation of two states, each 
guaranteeing certain (new) standards of normative state behavior, but the 
Partition Resolution was only partially carried out.60  The partition claim 
requires each community to create a constituent assembly of each “state” for 
the purpose of drafting “a democratic constitution for its state.”61  Such a 
drafting would be guided by an international mandate “guaranteeing to all 
persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and 
religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, 
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education assembly and association.”62  Israel was recognized as a state with 
the promise that a formal constitution would be adopted no later than 
October 1, 1948.63  However, the plan of drafting a comprehensive written 
constitution for the State of Israel, consistent with the expectations of 
Resolution 181, was never realized.64  In fact, the state of Israel is officially a 
Jewish state, and it has no constitution.65  Although there was a Declaration 
of the Establishment of the State of Israel, which announced that the new 
state “will endure complete equality of social and political rights to all its 
inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex,”66 this declaration was not 
passed by the Knesset and therefore has no legal efficacy within Israel.67  
Only one state was created (although it failed to adhere to the prescribed 
state behavior required of the Partition Resolution); and one state failed to be 
born.68 
D.  Conflict Following the Partition Resolution 
Armed conflict broke out between the newly born Jewish state and 
surrounding Arab states.69  To the historians of Israel, the resulting conflict 
became the War of Independence.70  To the Palestinians’ historians these 
events were catastrophic and were symbolized by the term “Nakba.”71  Since 
the Israelis thought that the Arab initiation of conflict was, in effect, a 
violation of international law, and since they repelled Arab attacks and 
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occupied territories beyond the partition line,72 the question that emerged 
was—since the Israelis considered themselves to be victims, and since they 
were somewhat victorious73—were they victims entitled to the spoils 
(including ground gains in territory) from the conflict.  Unfortunately, 
modern international law is not as generous regarding the acquisition of 
territory through the use of force.74  Thus, there was (and remains) a concern 
about the extension of Israeli sovereignty beyond its lawfully declared 
partition borders.75  These new borders were somewhat stabilized by the 
Armistice Agreements, founded on the military status quo, between Israel 
and the Arab states.76  A principle of realism seemed to influence the 
international appraisal of Israel’s new borders, which were shaped by the 
Armistice Agreements.  The United States’ delegation to the U.N. was 
instructed to support Israel’s request to keep the Negev.77  The U.S. 
considered that, practically, the Israeli borders were now a non-issue.  
Since 1948, the following events transpired: the Suez invasion of 1956, 
the Six-Day War of 1967, the October War of 1973, Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982, and the most recent War in Lebanon in 2006, and 
“Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza during winter of 2008–2009.78  It was after 
the 1967 Six-Day War that a number of Palestinian organizations joined 
together to form the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).79  The 
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Palestinian Covenant stipulated that: (1) Israel should be removed from its 
role as occupier of the West Bank and Gaza, (2) a Palestinian state is to be 
established in the West Bank and Gaza, and (3) the state of Israel is to be 
dismantled.80  Clearly, this final point hardened the resolve of the Israeli 
policymakers to strengthen the occupancy of the West Bank and Gaza.81  In 
any event, the occupancy of Palestine left no doubt that Israel envisioned an 
indefinite occupation regime.  This policy was supported by the full might of 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).82  This compelled the PLO to look to other 
strategies to advance its objectives.83  It sought to secure for its cause and its 
people a maximum amount of diplomatic recognition.  It stressed that the 
foundations of Palestinian claims to statehood were founded on the principle 
of self-determination, to which there was substantial commitment 
internationally.84  For example, Article 1 of the U.N. Charter expresses the 
idea of “respect for the principle of . . . self-determination of peoples.”85  The 
principle is reiterated in Article 55.86  Two significant conventions—the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)—include the affirmation that “[a]ll people have the right of self-
determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”87  
The U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations also affirms the principle of self-
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determination of peoples and stipulates that every state has a duty to respect 
this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.88  Also, in 1993, 
the World Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action.89  This document stresses its affirmation of the right 
of self-determination of all peoples.  The Helsinki Final Act also stresses the 
salience of the right to self-determination.90  
The PLO also secured recognition of its role as representative of the 
Palestinian people in their quest for self-determination.91  Recognition was 
given by the Arab League.92  This process has resulted in over 100 states 
recognizing the PLO.93  Over sixty states provide the PLO with full 
diplomatic status.  Fifty states recognize the PLO but have not authorized the 
establishment of PLO embassies.94  States also permit PLO offices to 
function under the name of the Arab League.95  These developments do not 
indicate the existence of a Palestinian state or government in exile.  They 
focus on the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian self-determination 
rights.96  As early as 1969, the U.N. General Assembly began adopting 
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resolutions that recognized the Palestinian right to self-determination as well 
as the recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian 
people.97  The PLO secured an invitation to participate in U.N. deliberations 
and conferences organized under the authority of the General Assembly as 
well as the Security Council.98  The PLO has had observer status at the 
U.N.99  Israel, however, has resisted the idea of “creeping” recognition of 
Palestinian institutions100 because they suggest a “creeping” validation of 
their claims.101  
Two of the critical decisions of the U.N. Security Council concerning the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict are Resolution 242 (22 November 1967)102 and 
Resolution 338 (22 October 1973).103 Resolution 242 recognizes the 
“inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”104  Thus, the 
Resolution stipulates that a form of “creeping” annexation of the West Bank 
and Gaza is effectively a violation of Resolution 242 and general 
international law.105  The Resolution also stipulates that the Charter requires 
a “just and lasting peace,” which includes some of the following principles: 
(1) the Israeli armed forces withdraw from occupied territories; (2) an end to 
the claim of belligerency; and (3) a respect for the “sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and political independence” of all states in the area.106  The 
Resolution also stipulates that freedom of navigation in international waters 
is to be respected, and refers to “a just settlement of the refugee problem” 
and also to the “territorial inviolability and political independence of every 
State” through the establishment of demilitarized zones.107  In Resolution 
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338, the Security Council called upon all relevant parties to implement 
Security Council Resolution 242 after a cease-fire.108  
These resolutions imply that the right to self-determination implicates 
rights that accrue at a minimum to a de facto state, including claims to 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.  It therefore calls for an 
end to Israeli occupation.  The United States, which has been a strong 
supporter of Israel,109 has been reluctant to recognize Palestinian identity in 
the international environment.110  This has been done pursuant to the Sinai 
Agreement of 4 September 1975.111  In this Agreement, the U.S. pledged to 
not negotiate with the PLO or to recognize it so long as it refused to 
recognize the right of Israel to exist and so long as the PLO refuses to accept 
Resolutions 242 and 338.112  Additionally, the U.S. Congress added a further 
element of the U.S. commitment—namely, that the PLO must renounce 
terrorism.113  In short, the U.S. position was that once the PLO publically 
accepted these resolutions, recognized Israel as a sovereign state, negotiated 
peace with Israel, and renounced terrorism, the U.S. would have a certain 
degree of negotiating flexibility with the PLO.  When President Jimmy 
Carter became President in 1977, he launched a significant initiative on the 
part of the United States to secure a permanent settlement.114  These 
initiatives culminated in the Camp David Accords.115  The Accords 
generated two critical frameworks: a Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East, which dealt with the status of Palestinian rights, and the Framework for 
the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.116  The first 
framework agreement was founded on the stipulations in Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 338.117  The United States, which had supported these 
resolutions in the Security Council, now explicitly endorsed them as a 
foundation for the first framework agreement of the Camp David Accords.  
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In effect the Security Council resolutions became a cornerstone of official 
U.S. foreign policy.  Since Israel signed onto the Accords it expressed its 
good faith endorsement of the same Security Council resolutions.  Egypt and 
the Palestinian representatives gave a similar endorsement to these 
Resolutions.  While progress was made, resulting in the peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel in 1979, little progress was made on the first framework 
agreement of the Accords.  However, Camp David established that both 
Israel and the United States were clearly committed to respecting the 
international law principles in these resolutions.                        
Subsequent U.S. practice has tended to retreat from the Carter 
breakthrough at Camp David.  For example, it may be noted that the U.S. 
also refused to recognize Palestinian claims to self-determination because it 
would lead to the creation of a separate state.118  In 1984, Congress codified 
the provisions of Resolution 242 into law, adding as a new condition that the 
PLO must renounce terrorism.119  In November 1988, the PLO issued a 
declaration of independence proclaiming “the establishment of the state of 
Palestine in the land of Palestine with its capital in Jerusalem.”120  This 
implicitly recognized Israel’s right to exist.121  Later, Arafat, representing the 
PLO, through a Palestinian communiqué, explicitly accepted Israel’s right to 
exist, accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced all forms of 
terrorism.122  After a series of PLO statements and clarifications, the U.S. 
administration said on December 14, 1988, that Arafat had met the U.S. 
conditions for a dialogue.  Secretary Shultz authorized Robert Pelletreau, 
U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, as the sole channel for the dialogue.  The 
dialogue was suspended by President George H.W. Bush on June 20, 1990, 
after Arafat refused to condemn in unequivocal terms a thwarted seaborne 
terrorist attack against Israel.  Meanwhile, as Palestinians sought recognition 
before UNESCO and the WHO, President Bush declared that any U.N. 
agency recognizing the PLO might lose U.S. funding.123  On September 10, 
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1993, the same day that Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual 
recognition, the United States announced a resumption of the U.S.-PLO 
dialogue.124  
The Oslo Accords, formally designated as the Declaration of Principles 
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements [for the Palestinians], were 
secretly negotiated in Oslo, Norway, hosted by the Fafo Institute, and 
completed on August, 20 1993.  They were publicly signed in Washington, 
D.C. on 13 September 1993, in the presence of Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin and U.S. President Bill Clinton.125  The Accords initially 
generated promising understandings that a peaceful settlement was 
achievable by providing a framework for the future relations between the two 
parties, for the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and for the 
withdrawal of the IDF from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.126  This 
arrangement was envisioned to last for five years, with the understanding 
that further negotiations would be covering the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, 
settlements, security, and borders.127  As nationalist political forces began to 
emerge within Israel, these final status issues never became matters for 
conclusive decision.128 
The not-quite-obvious subtext of Oslo was the concession that a 
Palestinian National Authority without an ostensible claim to sovereignty 
would in effect concede that the 1988 declaration of Palestinian 
independence was premature.129  On the other hand, the PNA’s future would 
be tied to a final status settlement agreement.  So long as Israel was reluctant 
to settle these issues, there could be no final settlement and no hope of an 
independent state.  Moreover, tying the status of the PNA to a process of 
agreement with Israel permits the Israelis to essentially exercise a veto over 
Palestinian claims to statehood by simply delaying the agreement process, 
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extending Israeli sovereignty by the de facto extension of settlement 
activity.130  It thus became apparent to the Palestinians that the new 
governing authorities in Israel, led by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu and his Likud party, were not committed to advancing the peace 
process because they opposed the creation of a Palestinian state.131  Having 
structured the legal expectations in terms of Israel and the PNA, the Israeli 
negotiators had a veto over claims to self-determination, independence, and 
sovereignty.  We now turn to the question of the possible recognition of an 
independent sovereign status for the Palestinian people in light of the current 
impediments. 
III.  THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CRITERIA OF STATEHOOD AND THE PROCESS 
OF RECOGNITION 
The interrelated legal issues of the “criteria of statehood” that are 
recognized today, as well as the specific effects and implications of the 
different aspects of recognition, are complex matters in international law.132  
This complexity was aggravated after the Second World War, when under 
the U.N. Charter a clearer picture of a framework of an international 
constitutional system emerged.133  Statehood and recognition thus became 
tied to a broader framework of issues and values.134  Among the issues is the 
question of entry into the international constitutional system as well as 
exclusion from it.  This issue is tied to the emergence of self-determination 
as a peremptory norm of international law as well as the strength accorded to 
traditional principles of uti possidetis, which in general discourages 
secession from a sovereign state.135  
The status of Palestine draws sustenance from recent developments in 
international law.  It is also influenced by its rather unique history as a Class 
A mandate under the United Nations.  The evidence of practice under the 
League demonstrates that Palestine was not subject to an alien 
                                                                                                                   
 130 KHALIL SHIKAKI, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, WILLING TO COMPROMISE; PALESTINIAN PUBLIC 
OPINION AND THE PEACE PROCESS (2006). 
 131 Ira Chernus, Israel and the Palestinians Through the Looking Glass, CBS NEWS (May 
27, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-20066760.html. 
 132 David O. Lloyd, Succession, Secession, and State Membership in the United Nations, 26 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 761 (1994). 
 133 Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Rise of Outsourcing in Modern Warfare: 
Sovereign Power, Private Military Actors, and the Constitutive Process, 60 ME. L. REV. 429 
(2008). 
 134 JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2007). 
 135 See SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED WORLD: THE ROLE 
OF UTI POSSIDETIS 169 (2002) (describing the context of uti possidetis). 
2012] RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD  363 
 
sovereignty.136  It was considered a state on a pathway to independence.137  
We explore these issues by first setting out the basic law as it currently 
clarifies the definition of state and the process of recognition. 
The definition of a state in international law is still influenced by 
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States.138  In this view a state is a territorially defined or definable entity.  It 
has a relatively stable population and its population and territory are under 
the control of its own government.  This entity engages or has the 
competence to engage in formal and diplomatic relations with other states 
and entities in the international environment.139  An aspect implicit in the 
criteria of statehood is that the entity should claim that it is a State.  
When we come to the question of the recognition of statehood we can see 
how the international system functions on two parallel tracks.140  First, 
recognition is decentralized and a matter of state sovereign discretion.141  
That is to say other states may or may not recognize the entity regardless of 
meeting the minima of statehood.  There are circumstances in which there is 
an obligation in international law not to recognize a state that has the 
minimum criteria,142 if that state has sought to establish itself in violation of 
the U.N. Charter.143  The other track is the recognition of a state as a member 
of an international body whose membership is restricted to sovereign states 
only.144  However, such recognition does not require that the sovereign 
formally recognize the government of another state, although the system 
provides for the recognition de facto of a state which acknowledges that a 
government and a state exist.145  That recognition could be understood as 
recognizing a state but not necessarily recognizing the government.  
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Recognition by an organization like the U.N. is also influenced by the fact 
that U.N. recognition is premised on the state’s ability to uphold U.N. 
Charter values, including its commitment to peace.146  These principles are 
more explicitly expressed in the Declaration of Friendly Principles.147  The 
principles are as follows: (1) states shall refrain from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; 
(2) states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means; (3) states 
shall not intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state; 
(4) states have a duty to cooperate with another in accordance with the 
Charter; (5) equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (6) sovereign 
equality of states; (7) states shall fulfill in good faith their obligations under 
the United Nations Charter.148  With these principles in mind we review the 
claim of the Palestinians to the recognition of statehood in international law. 
A.  Palestinian Statehood and the United Nations Mandate  
The criteria of statehood that requires a body politic is generally known as 
a population.149  The population issue in Palestine has been contentious since 
the initiation of the Class A mandate.150  The mandate recognized a 
population of Palestinians under Article 22 of the league mandate.151  This 
recognition was influenced by the mandate’s purpose to secure the 
population’s right to self-determination.152  However, Britain, the mandatory 
power, announced a policy for Palestine to secure a homeland in Eretz Israel 
for the Jewish people in the Diaspora, prior to assuming mandate 
responsibilities.153  This was expressed in the Balfour Declaration.154  
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Balfour, in confidence, expressed the view to the British Prime Minister that 
the major purpose of Article 22, namely the self-determination for 
Palestinian inhabitants, could not be implemented because of the undertaking 
to promote a Jewish homeland in Palestinian territory.155  As it turned out, 
because Britain was not able to emerge with a successful solution to this 
problem, it passed the matter on to the U.N. General Assembly.156  Article 
22, which juridically established a right of self-determination for the 
Palestinians, was left unimplemented.157  The critical question is how much 
of this right has survived to strengthen the claim to statehood under 
international law for the people of Palestine.  To the extent that the 
government of Israel may provide some impediments to the realization of 
statehood, international law may support a weakening of the Israeli position.  
One factor that has influenced Israeli perspectives is the claim that the 
Palestinians are not a people for the purpose of the population requirement of 
statehood.158  The evidence from careful research demonstrates a continuity 
of Palestinian national identity.159  Israel has promoted the argument that 
Palestinians are simply Arabs and therefore indistinguishable from other 
Arabs in surrounding states.160  Some Arab nationalists have in fact 
supported this view in the early efforts to create a Pan-Arab Union.161  The 
strength of nation-state national identity proved too strong for this 
innovation.162  We would therefore submit that Palestinians are a national 
body politic, with strong national identity, and with an identity that is 
continuous, particularly during the period of the U.N. Mandate and under the 
U.N. Charter framework.             
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The next key criterion is that the body politic must be territorially 
determined or determinable.163  In general, we would suggest that boundaries 
indicated in relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions established 
conditions which are determined or determinable.  There exist factors in the 
context which suggest that Israel, a key negotiator, may have broader 
territorial ambitions and this may be at the expense of Palestinian 
statehood.164  A justification for Israeli territorial concerns has been 
suggested by Prime Minister Netanyahu in his speech before the U.N. on 
September 23, 2011.165  Essentially, Netanyahu insists that because of the 
diminutive territorial status of Israel and a period of fifty years of war and 
insurrection, Israel has some implicit claims to territorial enhancement to 
ensure a higher level of security for the state.166  That is the practical issue.  
The Prime Minister noted that many states entertain a military presence in 
other states for mutual security purposes; for example, France in Africa and 
the United States in Europe and Japan.167  It is possible that the Prime 
Minister is also influenced by the idealism of the restoration of the historic 
boundaries of ancient Israel, the Eretz Israel idea.         
One pressing issue is the dynamism of territories and the requirement 
under Montevideo state qualifications that, if there is to be a Palestinian 
state, this state has to have agreed-upon boundaries that provide a viable 
territorial base for a state.168  The apparently interminable negotiations also 
formed a basis by which Israel can change the facts regarding the appropriate 
reach of territory that may fall within any settlement.  Essentially, one of the 
ways that the territorial question can be effectually pre-determined prior to 
negotiation is by a continuation and expansion of the Israeli settlement 
program.  Politically, the expansion of settlements is a cornerstone of the 
ultranationalist program and policy in Israel.169  This policy goes forward 
amidst a propaganda campaign that insists only the Israelis make concessions 
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and that the Palestinians “take and take.”170  It is worth a reminder that the 
Oslo Accords, in which Peres was a key player, involved Arafat giving up on 
the 1947 U.N. boundaries for the one defined in 1967.171  In doing so, Arafat 
gave up 22% of the historic Palestine;172 and Israel enlarged its territory on 
the historic Palestine from owning 56% to owning 78%.173  
The Obama Administration has insisted on a freeze on settlement building 
projects on Palestinian land.174  Netanyahu agreed to a ten-month freeze in 
order to encourage the initiation of talks.175  However, during these ten months 
construction was the same as in the previous ten months.176  The Obama 
Administration has pressed Netanyahu to give another two months for the 
freeze.177  The U.S. administration has had no influence on Netanyahu’s 
settlement policies.178  Moreover, the American administration’s position is 
weakened by the pressure of the American pro-Israel lobby.179  
Why is Netanyahu reluctant to stop the settlement expansion?  The longer 
it continues, the more intractable the foundation of a viable peace becomes.  
In fact, the settlement strategy may be meant to be a deal breaker.  Why 
would Netanyahu be interested in telling the United States he supports a 
settlement to the conflict while his activities and behavior all point in the 
direction of a strategy designed to continue fighting indefinitely with no final 
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conclusion, except one that is created on the ground?  Settlements are 
creating and contain the capacity for re-writing the map, making it 
impossible for future Israeli authorities to undo the map. Netanyahu has 
refused to give any assurance about the settlement freeze.180  
Netanyahu rules with a complex coalition of ultranationalist interests.  
The only legitimate boundaries of the state of Israel, according to them, are 
not defined by international law but by the history and antiquity of Jewish 
culture.181  This point was also stressed by Balfour.182  The historical 
boundaries of Israel, therefore, include Ancient Sumeria and Judea.183  In 
short, the only acceptable boundaries are those of Eretz Israel (a greater 
Israel).184  In this Israel, there is no room for Palestinians.  The boundaries of 
greater Israel direct us to another principle: the idea that there will never be a 
Palestinian state.185  It has long been accepted in ultranationalist circles that 
the Palestinians are not a real national entity or people and thus, as the 
argument goes, the Palestinians may not claim on the basis of national 
identity that they are people qualified to carry the mantle of statehood.186 
When we come to the question of the governance of the Palestinian 
entity, this represents a more complex issue.  Under the Oslo Accords, a 
Palestinian National Authority was set up.187  The agreement left final status 
issues as matters to be negotiated between Israel and the PNA.188  This 
implicitly left the PNA with a certain measure of internal autonomy, and 
some measure of external competence, but the Oslo Accords suggest that 
final status includes Palestinian statehood.  This understanding carries the 
assumption that the PNA does not claim full sovereign independent status 
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since the status must be negotiated with Israel.  Clearly, to establish a 
promising claim for statehood the Palestinians would have to repudiate any 
understanding that statehood is conditioned by an Israeli veto.  The veto 
would not be exercised in any formal sense.  It could be reflected simply in a 
strategy that is unwilling or reluctant to achieve a settlement.  In this sense, if 
Palestinian statehood is tied to the conclusion of an agreement with Israel, 
and Israelis are reluctant to conclude, their conduct amounts to a veto if it is 
also claimed that statehood cannot be considered by the U.N. or the 
international community unless there is an Israeli agreement.  The strategy of 
seeking recognition of statehood must address this question as well.  
Additionally, we suggest later in this article that more should be done to 
strengthen the framework of governance internally and externally and 
including the constitutional foundations of a future Palestinian State.     
It could be argued that Resolution 181 at least implies the idea that 
international law supports the notion of “an Arab state” as part of the Partition 
Plan.189  It could also be argued that the Security Council resolutions 
recognizing the West Bank and Gaza as Palestinian territories are de jure 
recognition that the boundaries of the Palestinian people are determinable and 
that the U.N. Security Council resolutions provide the baseline for determining 
the boundaries.  These resolutions form the foundation of negotiations relating 
to the Oslo Accords, which essentially involved an acceptance by the parties of 
these boundaries.190  This means that Palestinians have already conceded a 
huge portion of Palestinian land to Israel to secure agreement to settlement.  
From the standpoint of the traditional criteria of what constitutes a state,191 
Palestinian lands for a state are determinable.192  Second, although Israel 
occupies those lands, the occupancy vests no title in the occupier.193  The 
trumping legal principle is the legally binding Security Council resolutions.194  
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The second criterion of statehood is that there should be a permanent 
(Palestinian) population.195  There is a permanent Palestinian population in 
the West Bank and Gaza.196  What makes a final settlement complex is that 
there are now millions of (absentee) Palestinians whose citizenship rights 
were abrogated by Israeli legislation and administrative measures.197  Still, 
we can conclude that, at a minimum, there is a Palestinian population inside 
the territories occupied by Israel that qualifies as a permanent population.198 
The third criterion of statehood is having in place a functioning 
government.199  This issue is somewhat more problematic, because the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) was created as an interim entity and not a 
permanent governing authority.200  Here, the Palestinians, by drafting a valid 
constitution and creating a government under that constitution, could meet 
the criteria of statehood unambiguously.201  The PNA does meet some of the 
criteria relating to the capacity to enter into relations with other states.202  
The degree of recognition that Palestinian entities have received suggests 
that the Palestinian leadership is capable of discharging these obligations.  
The PNA has relations with at least 140 other states203 that could qualify as 
meeting the minimum requirements of diplomacy.204  Additionally, the 
observer status of the PLO at the U.N.205 and the degree of the PNA and the 
PLO’s participation in international organizations,206 significantly enhances 
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the claim that a future government has the capacity to enter into relations 
with other states and entities in the international environment.  
These are the criteria indicated in the Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States.207  Since the adoption of the U.N. Charter, there 
has been a modest change in the notion of sovereignty as the criterion of the 
legal personality of the state.208  That change requires that a state as a 
sovereign entity is able and willing to accept the rights, as well as the 
obligations, of a state under the charter of the United Nations.209  Since this 
would include the fundamental purpose and values behind the U.N. Charter, 
it would be appropriate that the constitution of a Palestinian state and its 
practices reflect on issues of international peace and security, commitment to 
the rule of law, a commitment to fundamental human rights, and a 
commitment to global security and democracy.210  These latter criteria are 
ones that bring an element of “authority” to the expression of sovereignty.  
It could be argued that Israeli sovereignty is somewhat diminished by its 
unwillingness to adopt the constitutional guidelines of Resolution 181.211  It 
has been commonly assumed that Resolution 181 provided the international 
legal imprimatur for the creation of the Israeli state and an Arab state.212  
Resolution 181 contained certain guidelines as to what the political structure 
of rights and duties of the future states should encompass.213  The Israeli 
leadership took the green light of the Resolution 181 and declared its 
independence.214  The Declaration was a document that complied fully with 
the guidelines of Resolution 181.215  However, although there was an intent 
that the Declaration should be the inspiration for the new Israeli Constitution, 
such a Constitution did not emerge.216  This means that Israel effectually 
refused to adopt its own declaration of independence as containing legally 
binding prescriptive norms.217  In this sense, Israeli objections to Palestinian 
statehood would appear to be objections to the mandate of international law 
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itself.  Our sense is that the only stumbling block on the pathway to the 
recognition of Palestinian statehood would be the United States exercising a 
veto over the process in the Security Council.  This would be an ill-advised 
vote, however, it is one that the Palestinians must strategically seek to 
overcome or minimize through the use of international provisions such as 
“Uniting for Peace,” which we will discuss in a latter part of this Article.218   
Currently, there are more or less 114 countries that already recognize 
Palestinian statehood.219  Such recognition is in the first instance a matter of 
state sovereignty exercised bilaterally.220  The nature of these agreements 
gives an advantage to the Palestinians for them to try to secure an 
overwhelming bilateral commitment for a recognition of Palestinian 
sovereignty.  Already, important Latin American states have given their 
commitments.  Additionally, it could also be advantageous for Palestinians to 
seek recognition of their statehood in regional international organizations 
such as the League of Arab States, the African Union, OAS, European Union 
etc.  Regional recognition would be politically efficient for the Palestinians 
to develop their constitution and constitute their government.221  With this 
background, it may be vastly more difficult for the United States to exercise 
a veto in the face of an overwhelming global consensus. 
It would seem to be clear that the recognition of Palestinian statehood 
must meet the Montevideo criteria of statehood222 and more under the U.N. 
Charter.  It must be noted that Montevideo was modified by post World War 
II developments regarding the criteria of statehood in international law.223  
The first issue is the recognition of their claims to territory.  First, U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 181 develops the partition of land.224  The 
boundaries indicated in that resolution were the boundaries adopted by Israel 
to define its territorial space.225  Since the Palestinians were not an organized 
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entity at that time,226 they were not in a position to either adopt the U.N. 
partition scheme or even to repudiate it.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, 
as we had earlier discussed, Israel’s boundaries were partially defined and 
Palestinian boundaries were determinable in this sense.  These determinable 
boundaries would meet the criterion of territoriality for State recognition.  
After the 1967 war, Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank.227  It still 
occupies those territories.  However, Israel has agreed to Resolutions 242 
and 338; and the Palestinians have agreed to the territorial dispensation 
indicated in these resolutions.  This means that Palestinians, in effect, accept 
less territory than originally envisioned in Resolution 181.  Boundaries may 
be redefined by agreement.  This means that Israel needs an agreement that 
will accommodate its settlement activity in Palestinian territory.  In short, 
settlement activity flies in the face of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and is 
therefore unlawful.  Here the lawfulness of the boundaries under these 
resolutions is grounded in the Security Council’s competence to make 
binding international law.228  The unlawfulness can be cured by an agreement 
between Israel and the Palestinians.  For such an agreement or understanding 
to have legal efficacy, it would probably have to be sanctioned or approved 
by the Security Council.229  One final point—the matter that does not make it 
into the front lines of negotiation-is the deep belief of Israeli ultranationalists 
that international law boundaries in the context of this conflict are not 
legitimate.  They use the legitimate boundaries of Israel as defined by ancient 
history, in which the ancient state of Israel was sovereign over lands, now 
claimed to be Palestinian.230  This is a deeply held belief;231 and it may well 
be that, so long as the extreme ideology of ultranationalism controls the 
government of Israel, there will be no final settlement that involves territorial 
determinations incompatible with the Eretz Israel idea. 
The next element of statehood is the element of governance.232  It would 
seem that the agreement to create the PA with a degree of internal autonomy 
goes a long way toward the requirement that there be a discernible form of 
governance with lines of authority.  However, it has been clearly understood 
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that the PA is not really meant to be a governing body in an international 
sense.233  This means that the PLO and its allies must reconstitute the PNA in 
the form of a recognizable government, with a working draft constitution, 
and with a framework of transparency, responsibility, and accountability.  It 
would also be appropriate that such an organization draft a constitution that 
approximates international standards in order to show that the Palestinian 
governing authority is willing, ready, and able to meet its international 
responsibilities under the U.N. Charter.  It bears notice that the U.N. partition 
plan stipulated that the constitutions of both Arab and Jewish states would 
guarantee “all persons equal and nondiscriminatory rights in civil, political, 
economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and 
publication, education, assembly and association.”234 
The declaration of the establishment of Israel indicated that the new state 
“will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens without 
distinction of religion, race, or sex.”235   After this promising start, the 
declaration was never adopted by the Knesset; and no efforts were made to 
draft a constitution along these lines.236  In our view, both Israelis and 
Palestinians would have benefited by establishing the Israel with a constitution 
based on this declaration.  It should be noted that the Knesset delegated the 
task of drafting a constitution to its Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, 
which has never presented the Knesset with a draft constitution.237  
B.  The Relevance of Recent Case Law 
Case law frequently provides the particulars of the background context 
within which the nuances of decisions emerge on the complex question of 
the validity of claims to statehood in international law.  The operational norm 
reflects complexity in the sense that these norms are in ostensible conflict.  
International law protects the territorial integrity of the nation-state and does 
not in general favor claims for self-determination and independence that 
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require the breakup of the state.238  The circumstances under which secession 
may succeed tend to be fairly situation specific.239 
There seem to be two salient formulas relevant to this context.240  The 
first presents a unified state in which one part of the state (defined by 
territory or the identity of the citizens) seeks to secede from the union and 
form a separate state.241  The consensus seems to be that, unless there is 
extreme ostracism or persecution of the separatist group by the unified state, 
secession should not be permitted.242   
The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case Reference re Secessions of 
Quebec,243 analyzed the scope of the right to self-determination with regards 
of the province of Quebec.  The court considered the questions put to it 
concerning whether the legislature might under international law have the 
right to unilateral secession from Canada.244  In an exhaustive analysis of the 
right to self-determination in international law the court ruled that in effect 
the population of Quebec was not an oppressed people and has not 
experienced attacks on their physical integrity or the massive violation of 
fundamental rights.245  The court saw the international right of self-
determination as being confined to situations of former colonies where there 
is oppression or situations of foreign military occupation.246  As indicated 
above, the claims related to Quebec for the possibility of unilateral secession 
were rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada because the claims of the 
Quebecois were not sustained by any sense of repression or disidentification 
by the state, which is in fact a rule of law-governed states.247  This decision 
supports the legal position of Palestinian statehood in the sense that it 
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clarifies specific circumstances under which self-determination and secession 
are valid in international law.  These circumstances favor Palestinian rights.    
The ICJ upheld Kosovo’s unilateral claim for independence and statehood 
under international law.248  There, particular facts concerning Kosovo 
seemed to have influenced the determination that Kosovo could secede from 
Yugoslav sovereignty.  Kosovo was an autonomous region under the 1974 
Yugoslavian constitution.249  As the constitution eroded, Serbian repression 
and notorious discrimination characterized the position of the Kosovo 
majority.250  In fact, international intervention was influenced by the prospect 
of a program of massive ethnic cleansing of the region.251  This established a 
provisional form of governance under U.N. authority.252  A further factor that 
supported the validity of the declaration of Kosovo independence was that 
negotiations for an internal settlement toward a final status seemed to be 
carrying on interminably and aimlessly.253  
The situation in Kosovo and the occupied territories is similar to the 
Palestinian situation in that, in both cases, the framework for continued 
negotiations toward a final settlement was actually taking place under the 
authority of U.N. Security Council resolutions.  In Kosovo, the interim 
government was directly created by the Security Council resolution;254 in the 
context of the occupied territories of Palestine, the Oslo Accords—which 
came under the broad authority of U.N. Security Council resolutions—also 
created the Palestinian National Authority as an interim institution of 
governance.255  In Kosovo, the International Court of Justice held that the 
representatives of the Kosovar people were not limited in their residual claim 
to sovereignty and independence by the U.N. Security Council resolutions.256  
Similarly, U.N. General Assembly resolutions would seem to strengthen the 
residual competence of the Palestinian people to declare their sovereignty 
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and independence.257  Unlike the Quebecois, the Palestinian claim also does 
not involve an issue of secession of titled territory from Israel; because Israel 
has no sovereign title to the territories it occupies.258  
We would submit that the factual background and reasoning of the courts 
in the discussed cases provides support for Palestinian claims to statehood 
and independence under international law.  In the case of Kosovo the court 
did not include a finding of Kosovo’s statehood but what makes the case 
relevant to the Palestinian situation, is that the governance of Kosovo at the 
time of its declaration of independence was set up under U.N. authority with 
provisional institutions of self-governance.259  Additionally, Serbia’s claim to 
territorial authority over Kosovo could be seen as stronger than Israeli claims 
to prevent the recognition of Palestinian statehood.  Kosovo was territorially 
a part of Serbia, whereas Israeli claims over Palestinian territories are those 
of an occupying entity.260  It would therefore appear that the case law from 
the International Court of Justice and the Canadian Supreme Court favors the 
lawfulness of the claim of the Palestinian people to the recognition of 
statehood, independence, and sovereignty. 
C.  Repressive and Discriminatory Behaviors of the State of Israel 
Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan, established criteria for 
citizenship without regard to religion or ethnicity: 
Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of 
Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding 
Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of 
Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become 
citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full 
civil and political rights.261 
Subsequent Israeli legislation and practice has ignored these issues.  Those 
practices generated a huge Palestinian refugee crisis.262  Most recently, Prime 
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Minister Netanyahu wanted to affirm the validity of internal Israeli practices 
on citizenship and statelessness by having the Palestinian National Authority 
agree that Israel (from the perspective of the Palestinians) is a “Jewish 
state.”263   
A brief reference should be made to the laws dealing with a preference 
for persons of Jewish identity.  The Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 
1970 (amending the Law of Return (1950)) effectually defines who is a Jew 
and, by implication, who is not.264  Greater specificity is give to these 
distinctions with regard to Palestinians in the Absentee Property Law of 
1950, the Entering into Israel Law of 1952 and Israeli National Law of 
1952.265  The Absentee Property Law defined the mass of Palestinian Arabs 
as “absentees” from territories that Israel conquered in the 1948 war.266  The 
law denies them the citizenship rights envisioned in Resolution 181 and also 
denies them the rights to their properties inside Israel.267  The status of 
“absentee” is inherited as well, meaning that children of Palestinian Arabs 
will also be considered “absentee.”268 
The absentee law simultaneously affects civic status and land rights.  This 
issue with respect to land rights is supplemented by legislation and 
administrative practices which are supported by Israeli basic laws.269  Four 
cornerstones make up the legal basis of Israeli land policy;270 the Basic Law 
establishing the Israel Land Administration;271 the Israel Lands Law;272 the 
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Israel Land Administration;273 and the Covenant between the State of Israel 
and the World Zionist Organization (Jewish National Fund) (1961).274  The 
net result of these laws is that non-Jews are excluded by law from 92.6% of 
the land of pre-1967 Israel.275  These and other administrative measures have 
created a complex background generating great sensitivity and salience to the 
settlement activity in Palestinian lands since 1948 and after 1967.  
In addition, Israel has a formidable array of defensive and emergency 
regulations so that the state is administered under a dual military-civilian 
system.276  The defense emergency regulations, which were inherited from 
Britain, include the power to detain, the power to deport, the power to take 
possession of land, the power to forfeit and demolish property, and the power 
to declare closed areas.277  These were supplemented by the Foundation of 
Legislation Law of 1980, which strengthened the powers of the state and 
weakened the rights of Palestinians.278  
Under the authority of this arsenal of complex laws, the critical question 
is of course the status of Palestinians in the territories that came under Israeli 
control after the 1967 war.  In 1967, Israel attacked Syria and occupied the 
Golan Heights.279  It also occupied the West Bank in Gaza, and the Sinai 
Peninsula up to the Suez Canal.280  Technically international law does not 
validate the acquisition of territory by the use of force.281  On the other hand, 
the occupancy of such territory, over time, may generate new facts and new 
expectations if the legal statuses of the occupancy (and those who suffer 
occupancy) are not appropriately clarified.282  The Palestinians have 
reasserted their claim to statehood covering the territories now occupied by 
Israel—namely, Gaza and the West Bank.283  The Israelis, while negotiating, 
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have been doing so in an interminable manner.284  It is possible there are 
interests in Israel that see continuous negotiation as an opportunity to 
incrementally change facts on the ground, by engaging in settlement activity, 
strategically placing roads for exclusive Israeli use,285 as well as limiting 
Palestinian development and civil rights.  
For example, the West Bank aquifer is a major water resource.286  Israelis 
use approximately 800 liters of water per day while Palestinians are allowed to 
use only an approximate of 200 liters per day.287  Israel prohibits Palestinians 
from drilling into the West Bank aquifer without permits.288 Palestinian 
construction of catchment basins to collect rainwater is prohibited.289  A wide 
variety of goods are deemed to be “war goods” (such as sewing machines); 
perishable Palestinian exports are delayed so that they are destroyed.290 
Moreover, income to Palestinians is restricted so that Palestinian incomes have 
to be more than twenty times less than that of Israelis.291  Israel limits 
entrepreneurial activity that may compete with Israelis’ and disrupts 
Palestinian schooling.292  The system of strategic roads has made 
communication a nightmare.293  The Israeli policy of targeted assassinations 
has focused on eliminating educated and moderate Palestinians, making it 
difficult to create a competent government authority.294  Israel controls 
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airspace and prevents Palestinian fishing operations in the Mediterranean.295  
Tens of thousands of homes have been demolished.296  Hundreds of thousands 
of fruit and nut trees have been destroyed.297  
The continuance of the conflict escalates tensions and, in turn, accelerates 
inter-group hostility between the Palestinians and Israelis.  One of the 
significant problems of inter-group escalating tensions is the propensity to 
shape human behaviors in terms of the perspectives of racism.298  This is a 
problem that cuts both ways.  In Israel, domestic critics seriously lament “the 
filthy wave of racism that is engulfing us.”299  The charge that Israel generates 
strong racist constituencies is both serious as well as a matter of extreme 
concern to the Israeli authorities.  The link between racism and the occupation 
is indicated in the actual practices of sustaining the occupation itself.  A recent 
book titled The Occupation of the Territories is summarized in Avnery’s 
newsletter.  The book recounts the testimonies of ordinary Israeli soldiers 
dealing with the daily and nightly life of occupation.  According to Avnery,  
There are accounts of nocturnal incursions into quiet 
Palestinian villages as exercises—breaking into random houses 
where there were no “suspects”, terrorizing children, women 
and men, creating mayhem in the village—all this to “train” the 
soldiers.  There are stories about the humiliation of passers-by 
at the checkpoints (“Clean up the checkpoint and you will get 
your keys back!”), casual harassment (“He started to complain, 
so I hit him in the face with the butt of my weapon!”).  Every 
testimony is meticulously documented: time, place, unit. 
According to Avnery, the matter-of-factness and the effort to avoid 
outrageous incidents strengthen the credibility of the book.  
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The intention of the book is not to uncover atrocities and show 
the soldiers as monsters.  It aims to present a situation: the ruling 
over another people, with all the high-handed arbitrariness that 
this necessarily entails, humiliation of the occupied, corruption 
of the occupier.  According to the editors, it is quite impossible 
for the individual soldier to make a difference.  He is just a cog 
in a machine that is inhuman by its very nature.300 
These reports should also be understood in the context of right-wing elements 
in Israel seeking to depreciate the civic status of Arab citizens.  This includes 
“loyalty oaths,” “religious edicts” that forbid Jews from renting apartments to 
Arabs, demonstrations in Bat Yam calling “for the expulsion of all Arabs,” and 
Tel Aviv’s “Hatikva quarter demand[ing] the expulsion of refugees and 
foreign workers.”301  Jews have been millennial victims of racism, and there is 
a great sensitivity to the concern that some elements in Israel promote a racist 
agenda.  The right-wing racists seek to challenge the “unequaled humanity” of 
the Judaic tradition.302  The religion “demands the treatment of ‘Gerim’ 
(foreigners living in Israel) as Israelites, because you were foreigners in the 
land of Egypt.”303  It should also be noted that foreign women are critical to the 
Jewish biblical history.  Bathsheba, the mother of Solomon, had been the wife 
of a Hittite.304  Her later husband, David, was the descendent of Ruth, who was 
a Moabite.305  One of Israel’s great kings—King Ahab—was married to a 
Phoenician.306  Our sense is that the occupation is a major contributor to the 
disturbing emergence of racism in Israel.  In this sense, Israel would benefit as 
much as the Palestinians from a just settlement. 
When the list of depredations is viewed in the aggregate, there is a sense 
that the occupying authority wants life to be an impossible struggle for the 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza.307  Palestinian resistance is equated 
with terrorism308 but, if they resist with non-violence they are not a serious 
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negotiating party or, the strategies of non-violence are simply viewed as 
weakness, permitting the Israeli side to up the ante.309  There are, of course, 
perspectives from the Palestinian side and perspectives from the Israeli side.  
Any balanced account in law must certainly acknowledge the reality of these 
perspectives.  One balancing factor to be considered is the Palestinian 
National Authority’s relationship with Hamas.310  The ambiguous nature of 
this relationship undermines the authority of the PNA; and the anti-Semitic 
posturing of Hamas challenges the willingness of other states to recognize a 
Palestinian state having ties to such an organization.311  
Another balancing factor is the complexity of Israeli society, which has a 
courageous community of human rights activists.312  This community (which 
supports the individual rights of Israelis as well as Palestinians) has gone 
mostly unheard in recent years, as the powerful ultranationalist establishment 
came to the fore with strong support from religious nationalists.313  The Israeli 
establishment is often supported uncritically by some fifty-two314 U.S.-based 
Jewish groups, sometimes described as “The Lobby.”315  While these groups 
apparently work to support “Israel,” the reality is that these groups largely 
channel money in support of the Israeli nationalist cause.316  Such distribution 
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of outside funding serves to marginalize center-left opinions in Israel.317  The 
influence of these groups is astonishing,318 and suggests great complexity and 
concern about U.S. involvement in the Middle East negotiations.  
One thing is clear—the system of occupancy administration falls radically 
short of the responsibilities of belligerent occupancy under international law 
and significantly undermines humanitarian and human rights law.  This 
weakens claims by the Israeli authorities for continued occupation of Gaza 
and the West Bank.  The influence of the Israeli ultranationalists on the 
American neo-con political interests was reflected in the vastly ambitious 
doctrine of the “Clean Break.”319  This doctrine, which sought to reshape the 
entire state structure of the Middle East, in effect, implies that the Palestinian 
problem in Israel is a sideshow.320  The Clean Break Doctrine promoted the 
idea of regime changes for the dictators of the Middle East on the basis that 
one could not make peace with authoritarian despots.321  Regime change 
favored democracy.  Events in Tunis and Egypt and other parts of the Middle 
East, which indicate strong popular demands for democracy, made 
Netanyahu wish that they had not taken him so seriously regarding the 
democracy issue.322  Presumably he misses the stability of an authoritarian 
friend like Mubarak.  
On the other hand, deeply rooted in the Israeli ultranationalist agenda is 
the idea of a return to an exclusively Jewish state without Arabs; that state’s 
boundaries being the boundaries of Eretz Israel.323  The current state of 
negotiations has floundered on the rock of Israeli settlement activity.  The 
U.S. has now admitted that it is incapable of generating inducements to 
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Netanyahu for a settlement freeze.324  However, the freeze is the essential 
precondition for Palestinian cooperation in the negotiation process.325  It is 
unclear what further steps the U.S. can take short of putting the squeeze on 
the Lobby, a squeeze that is beyond the capability of the Obama 
Administration.326  This has renewed the Palestinian interest in looking at an 
alternative strategy to secure its claim to statehood.  
There are some who propagate the notion that there is no such thing as a 
“Palestinian.”327  By refusing to permit Palestinians their identity, these 
individuals are laying the groundwork for rejecting the Palestinians’ claim to 
be a “people” under international law for the purposes of self-
determination.328  Some hold that the Palestinians are simply Arabs (and are 
therefore indistinguishable from the Arabs of contiguous states).329  Under 
international law, there is the recognition of rights of entities other than 
states; and this includes the right of a people to self-determination.  
As we have previously discussed, the right of self-determination has 
evolved by virtue of a framework of complex international agreements and 
international practices.330  However, there is not a clear-cut, formal definition 
of the idea of “peoples.”  Given this degree of unclarity, there is sufficient 
identity, coherence, and visible indicators of who a Palestinian is that, as a 
practical matter, it would be quite counter-intuitive to regard the Palestinians 
not as a people entitled to self-determination under international law.  The 
nature of the right of self-determination is expressed in a multitude of 
international instruments like Article 1(2)331 and Article 55332 of the U.N. 
Charter, which express the idea of respect for the principle of self-
determination of peoples, the ICCPR333 and the ICESCR,334 both stating that 
“[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination,” the U.N. Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, which also affirms the principle of self-determination of 
peoples and stipulates that every state has a duty to respect this right in 
                                                                                                                   
 324 Jill Dougherty & Elise Labott, U.S. Ends Bid for Renewed Israeli Settlement Freeze, CNN 
(Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/12/07/us.middle.east.talks/index.html. 
 325 Ashraf Khalil, Palestinians say Full Settlement Freeze is Precondition to New Peace 
Talks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 27, 2009). 
 326 Uri Avnery, Israel Lobby Humiliates Obama Administration, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG, 
http://www.countercurrents.org/avnery160309.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). 
 327 KHALIDI, supra note 159. 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id.  
 330 ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995). 
 331 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
 332 Id. art. 55.  
 333 ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 1, para. 1. 
 334 Id. 
386 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:341 
 
 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter,335 the 1993 World Conference 
on Human Rights, which adopts the Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action336 stressing its affirmation of the right of self-determination of all 
peoples, and the Helsinki Final Act, which also stresses the salience of the 
right to self-determination.337  It seems to be clear that the processes by 
which Israel exercises occupancy control over the Palestinians undermines 
most of the central elements of the scope of the right of self-determination. 
D.  Contemporary International Relations 
To some extent, Israel achieved statehood by first gaining support in the 
international community as a proto-state (especially by using formal legal 
tools like treaties) and then by unilaterally acting with sovereignty as a 
realized state (particularly by throwing off the paternalistic yoke of the U.N. 
requirements and by going to war with the neighboring militants threatening 
the new state’s borders and existence).338  The ruling authority of Israel was 
able to do this because it had the force of global opinion behind it.339  What 
seems to threaten the present leadership of Israel (who oppose the creation of 
a Palestinian state) so much right now is the wave of global support for the 
emerging state of Palestine.340 
Looking at the example of Israel’s achievement of statehood341 (in partial 
defiance of U.N. requirements342), it would seem that one clear sign of self-
determination is that the proto-government makes decisions in the best interest 
of the polity, whether or not these are the prescribed rules of formulation set 
out by the controlling entities in international law.  Nevertheless, the proto-
Palestine ruling authority must make the correct evaluations of what is an 
“assertion of sovereignty” and what is, frankly, detestable under contemporary 
international law standards.  The proto-state, while it must achieve sufficient 
independence to earn the qualification of “self-determined,” is very vulnerable 
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to international opinion.  Indeed, the fact that it must “earn” recognition 
(including independence) illuminates the forceful role of foreign opinion and 
international expectations in contemporary international law.  While 
international relations do not directly make law, they do frame the issues for 
the interpretation of relevant law standards. 
Over the last few months the Palestinians have been deciding whether to 
seek full membership at the Security Council, or to petition the General 
Assembly for an enhanced observer status.343  In January 2010, the 
Palestinian Foreign Minister, Riad Malki, declared his intention to seek U.N. 
recognition of Palestinian statehood in September 2011.  He also stated that 
he is currently lobbying for supporting votes worldwide.344  However, the 
U.N. route is not necessarily an easy process.  As we will discuss in more 
detail, because the General Assembly can only vote on membership based on 
a positive recommendation from the Security Council, in order to obtain 
U.N. membership, Minister Malki would have to first gain support from the 
Security Council. 
We have described the scenario of separatists who are granted the right to 
self-determination under international law.  That is one way that global 
opinion may frame the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories.  
Another scenario presents a framework unsupported by international law—
that of South Africa, a unified state, in which the pre-colonial residents of the 
state are ruled by the colonists in a disadvantageous way that denies the 
inherent dignity and self-determination of the pre-colonial citizens.345  Here, 
the consensus seems to be that, even with extreme persecution of one group, 
the state should remain united, but there should be a change in the laws and 
the leadership of the state to enforce the equality of all citizens under a single 
set of laws.346  However, there are distinct differences between the former 
apartheid situation in South Africa and that of the occupied Palestinian 
territories.347  
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First, the Jewish settlers have effectively ousted the former natives from 
the most valuable land (with historical monuments, urban development, and 
access to significant resources like water);348 and the leadership of Israel 
seems intractably set against welcoming Palestinians into a secular state of 
Israel as citizens and equals.349  Under international law, it is the sovereign 
right of Israel to determine who may become a citizen, who may be a 
resident, and what type of laws will govern the people within its borders.350  
Unless the Israeli polity itself changes these standards in constitutive acts (or 
violates human rights obligations to the extent that international entities 
pierce Israel’s sovereignty), external forces cannot transform Israel into a 
unified, secular, equal rights-based state. 
Second, the ousting of the Palestinians through military combat seems to 
have effectively settled Israel’s legal claim to the land seized in the 1948 war 
and subsequent military combat fought over Jewish settlers’ lands.  As a 
result, Israel has continued to gain land and extend its constructive borders 
through combat.351  Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories provoke 
protests and violent reactions of Palestinians, who, having no state, do not 
have a clear right to defend themselves militarily under international law.352  
If they claim such a right they risk being characterized as terrorists.  This is a 
unique situation, produced as a result of evolving international law regarding 
non-state combatants.353  It would seem to require further evolution of 
international law, to provide status for peoples who have no entity with 
sufficient international personality to protect and provide for them.  Given 
that the state is the most important viable juridical personality in 
contemporary international law for the protection of peoples and individuals 
under duress from another state, and that no state contiguous to the borders 
of the PNA (especially Israel) has provided this, as one scholar has put it, 
“[m]aintaining the occupation is clearly unsustainable because of the raging 
violence and the continuation of the state of war . . . .”354 
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IV.  INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES 
While it is clearly in our interest to suggest that respect for the 
international rule of law (especially regarding human rights norms) is best 
for all, we address the particular parties individually as follows. 
A. Palestinian Interests in a Two-State Solution  
The advantages of a recognized state begin with the idea that a duly 
recognized state would sharpen the legal question of Israel’s continued 
occupation.  The occupation in the face of recognized statehood would be 
tantamount to the occupation of territory by the use of force in violation of 
U.N. Charter Article 2(4).355  Thus, Resolution 242, which calls for the end 
of occupation, in light of legally recognized statehood, would add to the 
illegality of occupation by the assumption that the IDF’s occupancy is now 
that of an aggressor.356  A fully recognized state would make it difficult for 
Israel to negotiate or discuss violations of international law, which is a matter 
of state responsibility.  Additionally, the creation of a regularly constituted 
parliament, administrative agencies, and courts, the organization of the 
professions with state regulation and backing, and the organization of 
education and social services should all hopefully progress with the security 
of established and definable institutions of authoritative and controlling 
decision-making.  Most importantly for the Palestinians, the structures of 
good governance require transparency, responsibility, and accountability, 
and a respect for the rule of law.357  To the extent that the PNA is relatively 
informal at present,358 it suggests that influence may be generated by third 
party forces that may be partial to strategies of coercion and violence.359  
Thus, the benefits of open and transparent good governance could be a 
critical dimension of political responsibility in maintaining peace and 
security.  It is usually where governance is unformulated and loosely 
organized that there is an opportunity for penetration by terroristic 
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operatives.360  The establishment of a state would create a state constitutional 
ideology that stresses the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  All Palestinians would benefit from this.  The following table 
below provides a current statistical indication of the costs to the Palestinians 
of the current occupation policy and the value of sovereign status.361 
 
The recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state would improve the 
negotiating stature of the Palestinian negotiators.  At present, negotiations 
are structured around those of a sovereign State and its officials (Israel) and 
those of an entity which does not have the functioning diplomatic standing of 
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a sovereign State.  This suggests that the bargaining and negotiating structure 
is an asymmetrical one and that the Palestinians are the weaker entity in the 
process of agreement making.  They would still have to work through central 
issues for the purpose of a complete peaceful settlement with the state of 
Israel.  Those issues include Jerusalem, settlements, borders and related 
issues, water, refugees, political prisoners, missing persons and the remains 
of fallen persons, issues between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel, 
economic and trade relations, monetary affairs and claims resolution.362  
These negotiations implicate the complex map of Israel and Palestine 
including settlements, the wall and other issues of geographic complexity.  
The following map provides a guide.363 
 
MAP IMPLICATING PALESTINIAN INTERESTS SUCH AS THE WALL, 
SETTLEMENTS AND EAST JERUSALEM
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B.   Israeli Interests in a Two-State Solution  
Israeli interests in the recognition of a Palestinian state are complex.  We 
are rejecting the idea that the majority of Israelis will opt for a state of 
continual insurrectionary, low-level conflict that threatens to undermine the 
political development of appropriate institutions of good governance in the 
Palestinian territories.  It is therefore in Israel’s interest that a recognition of 
a Palestinian state with good governance principles, which will diminish the 
prospect of that governing authority being influenced by shadowy third party 
forces.  This type of government will provide the Israelis with the highest 
level of security, which they see as an important part of settlement.  In short, 
being freed from the shackles of occupation and constitutional good 
governance for the Palestinians with the prospect of enterprise could produce 
a stable and important political entity that would significantly stabilize the 
prospects for peace and security in the region.  The alternative is simply to 
deny any right to self-determination, realizing that this will have destructive 
consequences in the long term.  
There are two fundamental Israeli interests in the success of a negotiated 
settlement with the Palestinian leadership; negotiations that may be preceded 
or succeeded by the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state.  The first is 
Israel’s security interests; interests that are still dependent on United States 
support and could be in jeopardy if United States efforts at mediation are 
sabotaged by the extreme right wing that now runs Israel.364  Failure in this 
regard would compromise both U.S. and Israeli security interests.  The second 
major interest of Israel is the Israeli defense and promotion of the “legitimacy” 
of Israel.365  This is an issue that is extremely sensitive to the current Israeli 
leadership and their supporters in the diaspora community.366  The issue of 
legitimacy emerged in part from the effort of Israeli detractors who suggested 
that Israeli policy regarding non-Jewish inhabitants of the State were being 
subjected to policies analogous to some aspects of apartheid.367  Since 
apartheid was used by South African detractors to delegitimate the apartheid 
state, Israel’s opponents felt that Israeli policy and practices with regard to the 
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Palestinians had vulnerabilities ominously close to the policies and practices of 
Apartheid.368  For example, efforts to create a boycott of Israeli trade and 
cultural changes were vigorously opposed by Israeli interests.369  However, the 
problems of legitimacy now seem to be tied to the beliefs, ideology and 
policies of the extreme right wing in Israel.  And these policies committed to 
the Eretz Israel idea, which have racial overtones, suggest that repudiation of 
boundaries supported by international law and the idea that sovereigns cannot 
acquire territory as a consequence of conquest only exacerbates the problems 
of legitimacy.  Moreover, as a seen above, the treatment of the Palestinians 
appears to be discriminatory, and the recent war in Gaza seems to have 
involved a vastly disproportionate use of force implicating the possibility of 
war crimes violations.370  One of the most difficult issues, at least for the 
United States and for many sectors of the international community, is the 
extreme right wing ideology with racist overtones and concerns about the 
attacks of international legal institutions.371  These are concerns that are 
problematic for Israeli allies who generally represent liberal democratic 
ideological values.  Indeed, it is maintained that the overwhelming majority of 
Jewish Americans are inclined to liberal democratic values.372  It cannot be 
said that these values are shared by the current ruling elite in Israel.  We now 
proceed to consider related Israeli interests. 
Any important Israeli security interest could be clarified and advanced 
with the recognition of Palestinian statehood.  Israel has argued that rocket 
and terrorist attacks from the occupied territories gives it a right of self-
defense to respond to such attacks.373  However, this claim has not met with 
an approval that carries a global consensus.374  The technical argument 
against Israel’s claim to assert the right of self-defense is based on the 
principle that the occupied territories under Palestinian National Authority 
control are not recognized as a nation state.  It is therefore maintained that 
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Israel cannot assert its right of self-defense against an entity that is not a 
sovereign state in international law.375  This view has been supported by the 
following authorities.  The Congress has enacted legislation expressing a 
contrary view, suggesting that Israel does have a right of self-defense under 
these circumstances.  The U.S. Congress may of course declare international 
law; but the currency of its declaration (which is essentially unilateral) would 
seem to require more international acceptance for it to be seen as reflecting 
positive international law.  If the Palestinians were granted sovereign nation 
status, there would be no ambiguity regarding the assertion of the right of 
self-defense.  This at least makes it unequivocal that an Israeli self-defense 
response is clearly consistent with international law and international 
obligation.  At the same time, the right to self-defense in international law 
clearly telegraphs the corresponding obligations (of proportionality, etc.) on 
the Palestinian state, as well as the consequences to follow if those 
obligations were unmet.  
One implicit principle drawn from the claim of the right of self-defense 
by both Israel and the United States is that they are implicitly recognizing the 
qualities of statehood and sovereignty of the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories by holding them to a standard that unequivocally applies to 
sovereign nation states.  To the extent that the right of self-defense is 
clarified by Palestinian sovereignty, the mutual security interests of each 
body politic are significantly enhanced.376  
The fate of the state of Israel may be at stake, should Israeli leaders 
continue to stall development of Palestinian self-determination while 
forbidding real integration into Israeli society.  By aggravating the 
resentment of the Palestinians while disregarding the disapproval of global 
opinion, Israel faces difficult times ahead.  For so long, the Palestinian 
militants were characterized as terrorists because the world looked down on 
their resistance to the emerging Jewish state of Israel;377 but these militants 
may one day be labeled “freedom fighters” if the global consensus holds that 
the militants belong to an emerging state that was wrongly repressed by 
Israel.378  To receive the protection of international law rules and 
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organizations, Israel must behave with the humanity and lawfulness that 
international law entities (such as the U.N. Security Council) have come to 
expect from new states.  
One of the concerns that observers in Israel have noted with considerable 
disquiet is the emergence of racism in Israel.  They believe this is fueled by 
the extremist right wing political parties.  The first point here is that Israeli 
intellectuals and human rights campaigners are embarrassed by this.  The 
Jews in the diaspora have been millennial victims of vicious racism that has 
expressed itself as an ideological structure of “anti-Semitism.”379  The 
practices against Jews fueled by the banner of anti-Semitism culminated in 
the worst racist disaster the global community has ever experienced.380  That 
disaster where Jews were the primary victims was the Holocaust by the 
Nazis.381  It is therefore a great embarrassment to many Jews that some 
extremists in Israel feel free to exhibit the worst behaviors of pathological 
racism.382  The non-settlement of matters with the Palestinians fuels this level 
of insecurity.383  It will therefore seem to be a matter of some national 
urgency in Israel that a settlement be expedited.  We hold that a sound 
settlement would serve as powerful antidote to the insipient pathologies of 
racism fueled by Israeli right-wing fanatics.  The two-state solution seems to 
be one of the most achievable objectives in a settlement and therefore is a 
matter of important national interest for the state of Israel.  It is worthy of 
note that the basic and fundamental interests of Israel is its right under 
international law and practice, to exist.  It is possible that the two-state 
solution must do more than theoretically assure the existence of Israel.  
Recently Fidel Castro, former President of Cuba, stressed in an interview 
Israel’s right to exist and its concerns in the aftermath of the Holocaust that 
require important future assurances.384  Castro stressed that the right to exist 
was a matter free from any doubt. 
One of the most important contributions that Israeli society can make to 
the process of the creation of a peaceful Palestinian state is to contribute 
positively to the construction of institutions that value democracy and human 
rights Israeli society has a good progressive peace movement.  This 
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movement, contrary to the right wing sentiment in Israel, is not sectarian.385  
To the extent the PLO wants to construct a nonsectarian Palestinian state, it 
would be symbolically useful to have some modest degree of collaboration 
with the progressives in the region to advance the task of nation building in 
accordance with democracy and human rights principles.  It may be difficult, 
even for Palestinians, to work in cooperation with the Israelis, especially 
Israeli progressives.  However, such cooperation would send a powerful signal 
that repudiates the racism currently a part of the right wing agenda in Israel.  
Israel also has a courageous human rights movement with an abundance of 
legal talent386 and this resource could be extremely valuable in establishing ties 
of mutual trust and common interest in institutionalizing the culture of peace 
and human rights in a new Palestinian state.  Such ties, driven by the forces of 
civil society and with financial support from progressives in the U.S. and 
Europe, would do a great deal to change the paradigm of relations from 
conflict to sustainable collaboration in the common interest of all peoples in 
the region.  It should be noted that the driving force behind the Israeli peace 
lobby and human rights groups has a profound connection to the sacred 
literature of Judaism, which stresses that justice is integral to every form of 
human relationship.387  The idea is well expressed in the Book of Amos “let 
justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.”388 
C.  U.S. Interests in a Two-State Solution 
The continuance of conflict and tension between Israel, the Palestinians, 
and other Middle East states constitutes a serious security concern for the 
United States.389  In large measure, the conflict (at least in terms of popular 
perception in the Muslim world) sees a Muslim population being deprived of 
its most fundamental civil, political, and economic rights, and the repression is 
fueled by extremist elements in Israel, and their supporters in the United 
States.390  The conflict tends to assume the dimensions of ethnic/religious 
fanaticism, and such fanaticism invariably breeds apocalyptic visions that are 
embraced by alienated terrorists.391  The continuance of the conflict, with no 
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conceivable end in sight, has now become a much more immediate national 
security concern.392  The United States was attacked on September 11, 2001 by 
the Al Qaeda organization;393 and one of the justifications for the attack was 
the U.S.’s unconditional support for Israel and its policies vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians.394  The U.S. response to 9/11 involved the nation in high intensity 
conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan.395  It has been recognized that a central 
motivating tool for the alienation of activist Muslims, and their deployment as 
terrorists, is facilitated by the belief that Israel and its policies of occupation 
simply represent an extension of U.S. policy.396  Hence, the anger directed at 
Israeli occupation and Israeli anti-Muslim policies may also be attributable to 
the United States.  As a consequence, the continuance of this conflict fuels an 
ostensible justification for anti-Americanism and an assumption that, 
fundamentally, United States, too, is anti-Muslim.397  Given that there is a 
global population of close to 2 billion Muslims, the Israeli-Palestinian 
occupation is an obvious catalyst to move from alienation to terrorism.398   
It appears that the Obama Administration and the U.S. security 
establishment are aware of these issues.399  When the Obama Administration 
came to office, they were confronted by concerns in the security 
establishment that dragging out this conflict served as a recruiting tool for 
alienated jihadist terrorists.400  The specific issue for the United States 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became the security threat posed by 
ongoing conflict in the region.401  The current administration therefore 
brought a significant team of talented negotiators to press for the restart of 
negotiations toward a settlement.402  However, U.S. foreign policy regarding 
Israel is significantly conditioned by more than twenty-five pro-Israeli lobby 
groups in Washington, D.C.403 
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These groups are attentive to the needs of Israel’s ultranationalist cause; 
and, whatever the Israeli ultranationalist cause wants, it gets.404  The tools 
used by them and their allies in the United States are sophisticated and 
incredibly effective.405  For example, for several months now, domestic 
Israeli lobby groups have been giving the U.S. government and Congress a 
full-court press to prevent the recognition of a Palestinian state and, should 
the matter come before the Security Council, to be assured that the United 
States would exercise a veto in order to prevent a resolution supporting the 
recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state.406  This requires the Palestinians 
to think more carefully about the principles and strategies for which it can 
stake a successful claim for sovereign independence.  Israeli opposition 
effectually carries the support of the United States only because of the 
targeted pressure U.S. lobby groups can bring.407 
The influence of “The Lobby” is most recently evidenced in the recent 
House Resolution, No. 1765, reaffirming “strong opposition to any attempt 
to establish or seek recognition of a Palestinian state outside of an agreement 
negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.”408  This Resolution 
emphasized the principle that a lasting peaceful solution will only come 
about through the negotiations of both parties (meaning the state of Israel 
and the representatives of the Palestinian people).409  What the Resolution 
does not address is the inability of the Palestinian representatives to negotiate 
any solution with Israel while the parties bear such inequality in status.410  
Moreover, in condemning efforts of the Palestinian people to seek statehood 
(even by purely peaceful and legal means) outside of negotiation with Israel, 
the U.S. House undermines U.S. treaty obligations to support the 
achievement of statehood for the Palestinians.411  
This successful lobbying effort on behalf of the state of Israel reveals two 
characteristic aspects of the U.S. Israeli Lobby.  First, it can powerfully 
refocus the attention of the United States—even during the holidays, even 
with a “lame duck” Congress, even when the PA has committed no 
indiscretion justifying United States behavior contrary to its international law 
obligations and its own national interests.412  Second, the U.S. Israeli Lobby 
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does not engage with the U.S. government for U.S. interests but rather in the 
interest of Israel (arguably to the detriment of the United States’ foreign 
relations and security interests).413  Here, the simplistic idea, which some 
Congressional Representatives accept, is that Israeli and U.S. interests are the 
same.414  A more discriminating view would see that Israel has discrete 
interests.415  Not all these interests are the same as U.S. interests.416  
Moreover, from a global point of view, U.S. interests clearly transcend the 
particular state interests of the state of Israel.  It was the statesman Disraeli 
who once said that “states do not have friends, they have interests.”  Sorting 
out areas that are distinctive to Israel and distinctive to the United States 
would be a good starting point.  It should be noted that the neoconservatives 
strongly believe that there are no security differences between Israeli and 
U.S. security.  There are, moreover, reports that well-placed 
neoconservatives pass on sensitive information to Israeli officials on the 
assumption that, since there is no difference between Israel and the United 
States, by definition, they are not really passing on secrets.  
The question is whether U.S. national interests are discrete, even if 
somewhat overlapping, with the national interests of Israel.  However, it 
seems clear that the continuing conflict in Israeli-occupied Palestine 
increasingly undermines important United States interests. 
General Petraeus has raised a concern that, at least in the war against 
terrorism in Afghanistan, the continuance of the conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians serves as a recruiting tool for the global jihadists who commit 
themselves to terrorist operations against U.S. forces and interests.417  At 
least from a security point of view and from the point of view of the risks to 
the lives of U.S. soldiers and civilians who are serving in zones of danger, 
there clearly is a distinct U.S. interest in having the Israelis and the 
Palestinians shift their positions from conflict to some form of 
accommodation.  
The current Administration has taken this matter so seriously that the 
President went to Cairo to address the billions of alienated Muslims.418  
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Although the speech was widely regarded as a positive sign, this speech 
probably sent some apprehensions through the communications networks of 
the Israeli ultranationalist movement (sometimes described as the Israeli 
“right-wing”).419  Moreover, it is not at all clear that holding out the olive 
branch to the Muslim world would be a matter acceptable to the 
ultranationalist elements of the Israeli lobby.420 
The continuing deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has gotten 
to the administration.421  It has therefore made it a significant initiative of its 
foreign policy to purposefully move the parties to a meaningful negotiations 
posture.422  To do this, it drew on one of the heavy weights in negotiating 
accommodations in situations of complex conflict: George Mitchell.423  
Additionally, the President’s team has a strong Secretary of State (Hillary 
Clinton), who has no baggage suggesting any alienation against Israel.424  
Additionally, the Vice President, a strong supporter of Israel, is fully backing 
the U.S. initiative. 
A high point in the Obama initiative emerged in Washington, D.C. on 
September 2, when Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian President 
Abbas met and the Israeli Prime Minister declared that the success of the 
resumed negotiations would depend on both his and Abbas’ readiness to 
“make painful concessions.”425  The critical question that we address is 
whether Netanyahu was making a statement that was merely a temporary 
bend in the wind and that he did not in fact intend to consider seriously. 
The seriousness of the breakdown in talks between the Palestinians and 
Israelis and the effort to undermine U.S. mediation efforts have also 
prompted some of America’s most distinguished public servants to issue a 
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widely publicized document under the title “A Letter to President 
Obama.”426  The authors of this letter are extremely disquieted by the failure 
of U.S. Middle East diplomacy.  They see this as exacerbating Israeli 
isolationism and undermining moderation among the Palestinians.  They see 
the political vacuum as dangerous for all parties.  They therefore urged for a 
renewed American effort to revive its role in Middle East diplomacy.  
Providing a profoundly realistic summation of the central problems that 
confront the concerned parties, one of the issues they highlight is the vexing 
problem of the borders, but they also state that  
it is not the State of Israel within its 1967 borders that is being 
challenged.  It is Israel’s occupation, the relentless enlargement 
of its settlements, its dispossession of the Palestinian people in 
the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and the humanitarian 
disaster caused by its blockade of Gaza that are the target of 
international anger and condemnation.427   
These writers concluded their letter with a recommended framework for a 
permanent status accord.  We quote from their letter and summarized the gist 
of their recommendations: 
We understand, Mr. President, that the initiative we propose 
you take to end the suffering and statelessness of the 
Palestinian people and the efforts to undermine Israel’s 
legitimacy is not without political risks.  But we believe that if 
the American people are fully informed by the President of the 
likely consequences of the abandonment of US leadership in a 
part of the world so critical to this country’s national security 
and to the safety of our military personnel in the region, he will 
have their support.428  
It is unclear whether this letter has been distributed to the entire Congress 
and to the major lobby groups in Washington with an Israeli interest.  We 
conclude this section by providing a summary of what is proposed: 
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1.  They recommend the U.S. staunchly defend the legitimacy 
of Israel.  This is qualified by the phrase “within 
internationally recognized borders”; 
2.  The U.S. must support the establishment of a Palestinian 
sovereign State based on the 1967 borders.  Territorial 
adjustments are to be made by agreement only.  Unilateral 
acquisitions of territory in violation of international 
borders would not be recognized nor given legitimacy; 
3.  The U.S. will work towards a fair solution to the refugee 
problem.  U.S. commitment is based on the realism of the 
unlimited flow of refugees which would dramatically 
affect the demographics of Israel; 
4.  The U.S. will have a crucial role to play in appropriate 
security policy for both Israel and Palestine.  Here, the 
U.S. supports a demilitarized Palestinian State with 
security mechanisms that address Israel’s concerns and 
still respect Palestinian sovereignty.  This could include 
the stationing for multinational force as appropriate;  
5.  The policy on the emotive and touchy issue of Jerusalem, 
they recommend a form of complex shared control and 
unimpeded access to holy places; 
6.  The U.S. supports the reconciliation of Fatah and Hamas 
on terms compatible with the above principles and UN 
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.429 
As we see in the next section, these principles which provide a promising 
starting point for the Palestinians represent issues that may be anathema to 
Netanyahu and his supporters.  
D.  U.S. Interests and the Ultra-Nationalist Leadership in Israel 
The Israeli peace scholar Uri Avnery is pessimistic with regard to the 
current leadership in Israel.  “Netanyahu, of course, has no peace plan.  His 
declared position is that the Palestinians must return to direct negotiations 
without prior conditions, but only after they officially recognize Israel as ‘the 
state of the Jewish people.’  The Palestinians would never agree to accepting 
Israel as an exclusively ethnic Jewish state when there are over a million 
Israeli Arab citizens living there.”430  According to Israeli scholar Uri Avnery 
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the interjection into the negotiations of the recognition of Israel as a Jewish 
state has no coherent intellectual content and is used by Netanyahu “as a 
trick to obstruct the establishment of the Palestinian State.  This week he 
declared that the conflict has no solution.”431  Avnery adds that to deny “the 
Jewish character” of the state is tantamount to the worst of all political 
felonies: to claim that Israel is a “State of all its citizens.”432  
Netanyahu’s position is amplified to excess by his Foreign Minister.  
“The position of the Israeli Foreign Minister holds out even less hope for a 
settlement.  Lieberman believes that the Palestinians cannot be a peace 
partner because they do not want peace.  According to Lieberman, ‘[e]ven if 
we offer the Palestinians Tel Aviv and they withdraw to the 1947 borders, 
they will find a reason not to sign the peace treaty.’ ”433 
Lieberman also stresses that, currently, the Palestinians have no 
legitimate leaders because Mahmoud Abbas’ term expired on 
the 15th January, 2009.  Lieberman himself also adverts to the 
stability of the current coalition government running Israel.  He 
states, “[i]n the present political circumstances, it is impossible 
for us to present a plan for a permanent settlement, because the 
coalition simply will not survive.” 
If Lieberman sees no final agreement, Netanyahu holds out for an interim 
agreement of multigenerational duration.  The idea of an interim agreement 
simply means that settlement expansion will occur and East Jerusalem will 
be incorporated into Israel.434  It should be noted that most recently 
Netanyahu had a telephone conversation with Angela Merkel, the German 
Chancellor.  The gist of this conversation is reported in Avnery’s newsletter 
of March 5, 2011.  According to Avnery;  
Netanyahu called to rebuke Angela Merkel for Germany’s vote 
in favor of the Security Council resolution condemning the 
settlements — the resolution blocked by the scandalous US veto.  
I don’t know if our Prime Minister mentioned the Holocaust, but 
he certainly expressed his annoyance about Germany daring to 
vote against the “Jewish State.” He was shocked by the answer.  
Instead of a contrite Frau Merkel apologizing abjectly, his ear 
was filled by a schoolmistress scolding him in no uncertain 
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terms.  She told him that he had broken all his promises, that no 
one of the world’s leaders believes a single word of his anymore.  
She demanded that he make peace with the Palestinians.435  
When the Israeli Foreign Minister (Lieberman) recently spoke before the 
U.N. General Assembly, indicating that (contrary to Netanyahu’s Washington, 
D.C. statements) there was no chance for a peace treaty (not within a year or 
100 years), this implied a multigenerational interim agreement and limitless 
Israeli occupation.436  Lieberman’s solution is to radically press for an Israeli 
state free of Arabs.437  It is unclear whether this implies ethnic cleansing for 
non-Jews; but that would appear to be what Lieberman has in mind.  
As Israel’s Foreign Minister, Lieberman is an important influence on 
Israeli foreign policy and, in particular, the promise (or lack of it) of 
negotiating a settlement.  Recently, he summoned Israel’s 170 senior 
diplomats to provide them with a firsthand account of his thinking.438  It 
should be understood that, according to Avnery, Netanyahu does not have a 
peace plan.  He has only insisted that the Palestinians return to negotiations 
without prior conditions, but only after they recognize Israel as a state of the 
Jewish people.439  Such recognition clearly repudiates the Israeli Declaration 
of Independence, which rejects such a definition of the state.440  It is unlikely 
that the Palestinians who are committed to a secular state would seek to 
endorse a racially chauvinistic state.  Lieberman holds to a view that is more 
concrete and more radical that Netanyahu.441  Lieberman firmly believes that 
the Palestinians do not want peace.  According to Lieberman, “ ‘even if [we] 
offer the Palestinians Tel Aviv and a withdrawal to the 1947 borders, they 
will find a reason not to sign a peace treaty.’  (The 1947 borders, fixed by the 
United Nations, gave Israel 55% of the country, while the 1949–1967 
borders left Israel with 78%.).”442  Additionally, Lieberman believes that, 
since the term of Mahmoud Abbas has expired, there is no one to negotiate 
with.443  Finally, Lieberman stresses that moving purposefully with peace 
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negotiations would split the right-wing coalition and possibly their 
government would not survive.444  In short, the survival of the current 
coalition is far more important than reaching a permanent settlement with the 
Palestinians.  Since Lieberman believes this coalition will last indefinitely, 
peace may not be possible presently or indeed in the coming decades.  
Therefore, Israel should strive for a “Long-Term Interim Agreement.”445  
The essence of this is of course a long-term period of occupancy.  The carrot 
to the Palestinians would essentially be to give them a bigger piece of the 
economic pie.  Avnery sums up Lieberman as follows: “The occupation will 
continue until one of the following happens: either the Palestinian standard 
of living will reach that of Israel or the Messiah will come—whichever 
happens first.  In any case, there is no clear indication that either will happen 
within the next few decades.”446 
Netanyahu put some mild distance between Lieberman’s views and his 
own.  The mildness of the distance may suggest that Netanyahu is (in 
principle) on the same page as Lieberman.  We must therefore look more 
carefully at what Netanyahu’s policies are.  It would seem that these policies 
will be critical for the U.S. to better understand its role in this region.  
Netanyahu’s father, Benzion Netanyahu, was a professor of history.447  He 
was a deep believer in the Eretz Israel defining the target boundaries of 
Israel.448  Netanyahu was raised in a family in which Israel’s historic 
boundaries were sacred and inviolable.449  According to an Israeli journalist, 
Netanyahu would “not dare to face his father and tell him that he has given 
away parts of Eretz Israel.”450  Netanyahu’s personality is predisposed to 
delay a successful peace negotiation in which boundary settlements are 
envisioned.451  
The most recent breaking development concerning settlement activity has 
emerged as the Israeli government has apparently secured the assurance of a 
U.S. veto.452  The U.S. has justified the veto, as has Israel, by claiming any 
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resolution supporting a Palestinian State is an impediment to the process of 
direct negotiations between the Palestinians and Israeli to secure a settlement.  
As we noted earlier this year, the Israeli Prime Minister rejected a U.S. call for 
a temporary cessation of settlement building activity in order restart the 
negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement.453  The current Israeli 
authorities have now approved the construction of 1,100 new Israeli housing 
units in East Jerusalem on lands that ostensibly are within the dominion of the 
Palestinians.454  Clearly such a move at this time tremendously undermines the 
representations made by the Israeli Prime Minister and the American President 
at the U.N.  The United States, the European Union and the U.N. have all 
expressed “disappointment” at this initiative and its unfortunate timing.455  
U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, indicated that this issue was 
“counterproductive to efforts to launch peace talks.”456  She added that this 
amounted to provocative action.457  Richard Miron, spokesman for U.N. 
Middle East Envoy Robert Serry, indicated that the Jerusalem housing 
announcement “sends the wrong signal at this sensitive time.”458  Palestinian 
leaders have indicated that there be a halt to settlement building as a condition 
for the resumption of peace talks.459  It seems to us that only strong pressure, 
sufficiently important to compel him to shift his position, will make the 
difference.  Without such pressure, Obama is wasting his time.  And, by 
pressure, we do not mean only the pressure of the government.  Critical to 
pressuring Netanyahu will be a significant number of congressional 
representatives, supporting the administration, and (even more critically) 
getting the major Jewish organizations in the United States to be willing to 
fully support a realistic peace process because it is in the national interest of 
the United States and of Israel.  So long as the Israeli support groups in the 
United States provide support only to the Israeli ultranationalists, the 
intransigence of the Israeli ultranationalists to commit to a realistic settlement 
will be greater.  This is not to say that the Israeli nationalists are the exclusive 
stumbling block to a final resolution, but it certainly is a crucial barrier.  
Finally, a continuation of conflict may suggest to the ultranationalists in Israel 
that conflict favors them in the long haul.  Israel’s military superiority is a 
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destabilizing force that becomes even more dangerous when the levels of 
conflict sporadically spiral out of control.  They also create an incentive for the 
states surrounding Israel to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.  Thus, the 
conflict has global implications.  Our sense is that a majority of the Israelis 
would opt for a reasonable settlement with a reasonable adjustment of 
territorial interests.  We do not believe that a majority of Israelis are opposed 
to a Palestinian state living in peace with Israel.  However, like most 
ultranationalist groups, the Israeli ultranationalist contingency is engaged, 
energized, and occasionally fanatical.  
Israel and the United States have divergent interests regarding military 
intervention in the Middle East and sustaining the role of international law 
regarding such interventions.  The Bush Administration allied itself with 
Israeli interests in the Middle East and the United States ended up fighting 
wars both questionable for the benefit to U.S. interests and for the legal right 
to preemptively engage in such wars under international law.460  The U.S. 
policy leaders at the time invested in extravagant security ideas originally 
generated by the Likud, such as the “Clean Break” doctrine.  This doctrine 
found itself mutated after 9/11 into the Bush Doctrine, which claimed 
preemptive intervention.461  With the Israeli right-wing cheering, the U.S. 
invaded Iraq, generating massive anti-Americanism not only in the Islamic 
world but elsewhere.462  Nevertheless, the roots of the desire to attack Iraq 
came from the Likud’s Clean Break Doctrine and Israel’s interest in regime 
change was because they saw Saddam Hussein as a serious security 
challenge to Israel.463  With Saddam gone, there has been a relentless 
campaign for regime change Iran.464  In fact, the Israeli attack on Lebanon 
and Hezbollah was, in effect, a transparent effort to provoke Iran into 
intervention to protect its client (Hezbollah).465  When Iran restrained itself, 
the Israelis found themselves in the midst of a significant tactical defeat.466  
Still, Netanyahu and others (and their surrogate voices in the United States) 
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stridently demand a U.S. attack on Iran.467  These views are vigorously 
promoted by the Likud’s neoconservative allies.468  The question here is—
exactly to whom is Iran such a monumental threat?  How imminent is this 
threat (if it is a threat)?  Clearly, both the United States and Israel have 
interests in the evolution of Iranian politics, but these interests are not the 
same.  The Netanyahu “Clean Break” Doctrine had significant influence on 
the “Bush Doctrine,” in particular its commitment to preemptive action and 
regime change.469  The adherence to this doctrine in the United States is 
largely—but not exclusively—affiliated with the pro-Israeli lobby groups as 
well as the Republican neo-cons.470  
In the Senate, Senators Graham and Lieberman have been most articulate 
in demonizing Iran, describing the country as “extreme,” “expansionist,” and 
“terrorist.”471  Graham has specifically indicated that the military option 
against Iran should have in mind “the goal of changing the regime.”472  Bill 
Kristol, the editor of the Weekly Standard and director of the Foreign Policy 
Initiative, is a leading voice following Richard Perlel in the neoconservative 
movement.473  Kristol believes that the credible threat of a military strike is 
the only option to constrain Iranian ambitions.474  John Bolton, who was the 
Bush Administrations’ undiplomatic ambassador to the U.N., has declared 
that sanctions and negotiations against Iran are useless.475  He has stated that 
the goal of neoconservative opinion makers should be to prepare U.S. public 
opinion to support an Israeli attack on Iran.476  One of the most vociferous 
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exponents of the use of force against Iran is Reuel Marc Gerecht, who 
believes “an Israeli bombardment remains the only conceivable means of 
derailing or seriously delaying Iran’s nuclear program.”477  Gerecht also 
believes that an attack on Iran would force regime change.  The hardline 
ideologue Daniel Pipes is one of the most aggressively pro-Likud voices in 
D.C.; he also has strong Islamophobia.478  Pipes has recently stated that the 
recipe for salvaging the Obama presidency is the bombing of Iran.479  Pipes 
maintains that if the United States is reluctant, Israel “should do the job.”480  
Pipes is viewed by other conservatives as an extremist.481  
The neoconservatives were the biggest drumbeaters for the attack on Iraq 
and the neglect of Afghanistan.482  It was Iraq that was Israel’s major security 
concern.483  The Iraq War was a trillion dollar war.484  The price continues to 
mount.485  Additionally, there is strong opinion in the United States 
indicating war fatigue.486  We would submit that it is not in the national 
interest of the United States at this time to start a new war in the Middle East.  
Moreover, it is doubtful, notwithstanding the unpopular attitude of the 
Iranian regime, that the majority of the American people would support a 
new neoconservative adventure.  In this sense, it would be of value for the 
Obama administration to repudiate those aspects of the Bush Doctrine that 
are controversial and challenge international law.  The pressures from Israel 
and its supporters in the United States for a new war stem from the security 
problems that are a product of the unstable situation in the region, generated 
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significantly by the lack of settlement between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. 
The United States has an interest in halting the evolution of Israel as a 
center of international crime.  Some analysts believe it to be the premier 
money-laundering nation in the world and claim that Israeli criminal cartels 
are deeply involved with smuggling blood diamonds, white slavery, human 
trafficking, drug trafficking, and more.487  While assistance to Israel is 
clearly not meant to support the criminal elements of Israeli society, it seems 
clear that not enough is being done by the Israeli government to bring these 
criminal elements under control.  This, in turn, suggests that the Israeli 
government condones or even colludes with these criminal non-government 
actors—a behavior that must not be allowed in Israel, Palestine, or anywhere 
on the world stage.  
The U.S. supplies Israel with the best military technology;488 but in the 
future this may not be in the best interest of the United States.  Despite the 
history of good relations in the past, Israel and the United States have been 
on rocky footing in recent times.489  The United States could not influence 
the Israeli government to halt settlements no matter how many highest-grade 
fighter planes the United States offered them.  Nor could the United States 
induce Israel to behave with transparency and in conformity with 
international law regarding their nuclear weapons.  Indeed, Israel has a 
significant trade in weapons sales; and holds that the weapons sales issues490 
mean that Israel has no friends.  Given the disinclination of Israel to 
cooperate with U.S. diplomacy and international law norms, Israeli weapons 
technologies may well be deployed against U.S. troops in the future.491 
In these difficult financial times, there is the obvious interest of the U.S. 
citizens in retaining the wealth transferred to Israel for activities that do not 
engender peace.  The state of high-security crisis in Israel is funded largely by 
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U.S. assistance.  In addition to supplementary sources of funding from private 
U.S. individuals and organizations, there is enormous pressure on the U.S. 
government to increase aid to Israel from $10 billion to at least $20 billion a 
year.492  It is estimated that Israel has received some $2 trillion from the 
American taxpayers since 1967.493  As vast billions of U.S. dollars are being 
borrowed to fund the security needs of the state of Israel, this debt is passed to 
the children of America’s future, along with mounting unrest in a region under 
occupancy sustained by U.S. assistance.  A dramatic move toward the 
recognition of Palestinian statehood as a step toward an accelerated peaceful 
settlement would lessen Israel’s security anxieties and the need for assistance 
from borrowed trillions now owed by the U.S. taxpayers.494 
U.S. policy and the interest groups involved in the Middle East should be 
very discriminating about which groups they support in this region and in 
Israel, to ensure that the U.S. interest in peace and security is not held 
hostage by ultranationalist zealots.495  In terms of contemporary international 
relations, Israeli ultra-nationalism is a danger to regional peace and security.  
It is quite possible that the greater Israeli interests and U.S. interests are the 
same, while the interests of the current Israeli leaders are different.  The 
critical challenge for pro-Israel individuals, communities, and lobby groups 
in the United States is to determine which of their activities support U.S. 
interests—particularly national security interests and longstanding peace in 
the region—and which activities undermine U.S. interests. 
E.  Global Community’s Interests in a Two-State Solution 
There are clearly some developments and precedents in international and 
human rights law that would benefit the global community as a result of the 
establishment of a Palestinian state (existing peacefully with the state of 
Israel).  There is clearly a problem with the current status of international law 
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regarding stateless individuals.496  While treaties attempt to address their 
problems, the reality is that customary international law affords little 
protection to stateless people who suffer continuing abuses by other states.  
Moreover, there is a problem with the U.N. Security Council veto-system, 
which occasionally works to undermine the efforts of widely-held global 
opinion.497  It would strengthen the force of the United Nations (and, 
consequently, international law) to have the U.N. Security Council bypass 
mechanism in effect yet again to give power to the General Assembly’s 
voice.498  It reflects well of our times that the highest constituted authority 
speaks for even the least represented.  It is the next stage in the development 
of the United Nations that the united “nations” include those people who still 
do not have a state.  And if statehood is the requirement for a “nation” to 
have a vote, then all nations deserve a state.  One final point.  The Israeli 
right wing and its neoconservative allies have been waging a relentless war 
against the United Nations.  This is not good for Israel, for the U.S. or the 
U.N. The recognition of the Palestinian State may take us past the period of 
international acrimony.  
V.  THE ROAD MAP FOR SECURING THE RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN 
STATEHOOD 
In the interest of achieving a just and stable peace in the contested lands 
in the control of Israel (a goal implicit in the expeditious recognition of 
Palestinian statehood), we make suggestions on a few policy matters.  Most 
of these suggestions must be acted upon by the Palestinian governing bodies.  
Nevertheless, the transparency of these policy activities is crucial since, as 
indicated earlier, members of the world community (including not only Israel 
and members of the U.N. Security Council, but also individual states and 
members of state associations) have important parts to play in the process of 
achieving a viable state of Palestine. 
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Of the two real paths to Palestinian statehood, one involves the help and 
guidance of Israel to achieve the type of state indicated in the U.N. Resolution 
on Partition and the Oslo Accords.499  Israel has long held the support of the 
world community—especially the United States—in preparing for the final 
agreement on Partition.  However, the longer Israel delays this process (while 
simultaneously refusing the Palestinian people real inclusion in a unified 
society based on equal laws and equality of religion) and defies agreements to 
contain settlement activities within established borders, Israel increasingly 
risks isolating itself from the external powers that have supported its activities 
(and refused “unilateral” recognition to a state of Palestine).  This “unilateral” 
path is the alternative path to Palestinian statehood—unilateral recognition 
under international law, bolstered by international relations, and—ultimately—
sanctified by the U.N. Security Council.  
The negotiations process overseen by the Obama administration has 
completely broken down recently.500  This has been due in large part to 
extraordinary contingencies that Israeli representatives have placed upon 
negotiation, which included the Palestinian recognition of Israel as an 
ethnically exclusive state and the premise that Jerusalem belongs to Israel 
(and, as such, that there are no restraints to the building of settlements in East 
Jerusalem).501  Moreover, as the Israelis have embarked on more settlement 
activity, the Palestinians have refused to participate as well.502  Both 
President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton condemned these 
contingencies and the continuing settlements as unhelpful to the negotiations 
process.503  A more candid view may be that these activities are “deal 
breakers,” and the Israeli government intends to disappoint, recklessly 
undermining legitimate expectations under law to continue negotiating a fair 
resolution of the problem in good faith with the Palestinian people.  
Such an assessment—that current Israeli leaders are actively blocking 
Palestinians’ efforts to achieve statehood—is one that the Palestinian 
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National Authority (and the world community) must consider.  In such a 
case, where Israeli policies actively damage Palestinians’ interests in their 
property, security, and ultimate self-determination, the body governing the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza (currently, the PNA), must 
consider moving forward “unilaterally”; and, so long as the PNA acts with 
regard to contemporary standards of human rights and rule-of-law norms, the 
international community has an ethical obligation to support the Palestinians’ 
efforts.  Moreover, certain states and international entities have a legal 
obligation to support the Palestinians’ efforts.504  There are strong policy 
decisions and moves to be made.  We take the liberty of presenting some 
suggestions as to how to proceed strategically.  
A.  The PA Should Establish a Functioning Government Explicitly Based on 
International Law Criteria   
The PA may not be considered to have sufficient control over Palestine, 
given that its authority is subordinate to Israel’s sovereign control under the 
Oslo Accords and the Interim Agreement’s express prohibition of PA from 
conducting foreign relations.505  However the PA should move to the process 
of elections from the old Palestinian Parliament, to a newly constituted 
Parliamentary authority.  It is probably appropriate that the Parliament act to 
create a constituent Assembly for the purpose of drafting a Constitution of 
the State of Palestine.   
B.  The PA Should Promote “Good Governance” by Establishing the 
Preconditions for a Parliament to Create a Constituent Assembly and to 
Draft a New, Sovereign Constitution  
We are uncertain whether the documents generated by the PNA amount 
to a constitution (as compared to constitutions in contemporary practice).  
We would suggest, however, that in preparation for recognition the historic 
documents be integrated into a formal constitution of the state of Palestine.  
Our recommendation would further be that this should be a document 
meeting the best contemporary normative standards.  In other words, the 
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form of governance should be democratic, transparent, accountable, and 
responsible.  It should also be founded on the “rule of law” principle.506  
Additionally, we would suggest that the PNA examine the Badinter 
Arbitration Commission’s deliberations concerning the recognition of the 
statehood of the Balkan states (including Bosnia and Herzegovina).507  The 
Badinter Commission carefully reviewed the constitutions of these new 
states for the purpose of recognition by the European Union and (later) by 
the United Nations.  These were obtained on the basis that the constitutions 
made the rights and duties of individuals depend on citizenship (rather than 
ethnicity or religious identity).  
Recognition by the United Nations, in any event, is dependent on a 
showing that the entity claiming sovereignty has the willingness and capability 
of upholding the principles of the U.N. Charter.  In short, the entity must be 
peace loving and committed to human rights and the rule of law. 
C.  The PLO Should Reaffirm the 1988 Declaration of Independence in Light 
of the Creation of a New Government and a New Constitution 
By reaffirming the earlier 1988 Declaration508 the PNA is stressing the 
consistent and continuing demand of the right of the Palestinian people to 
self-determination and independence.  Reaffirming this iteration strengthens 
the perception of the coherence and continuity of the Palestinian perspective 
of identity.  
D.  The PNA Should Secure Bilateral Recognition of the New Government 
and State Worldwide  
The actual process of recognition is complex.  At one level, states usually 
claim that (as a function of their sovereignty) they have complete discretion 
whether to recognize another state or not.509  On the other hand, recognition 
by regional associations of states tends to be less politicized and more 
focused on the willingness and sense of obligation to conform to regional 
standards of peace, security, and human rights.510  We would recommend 
that the PA present its case to states that clearly would recognize it as a state 
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on a bilateral basis.  It is possible that the Palestinians could get 90% of the 
world’s states recognizing them.511  
E.  The PNA Should Encourage Regional Organizations to Recognize the 
New Government and State  
These would include such organizations as the Arab League, the Arab 
League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO), and 
the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League’s Council of Arab 
Economic Unity (CAEU).  We would also simultaneously recommend that 
the PA secure recognition from regional alliances of states (such as the 
League of Arab States, the African Union, the European Union, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and others).  Our sense is, if a 
sizable number of individual states recognize Palestinian statehood, it would 
ease recognition in regional associations of states.  This would strengthen the 
sovereignty process of Palestine before the United Nations.  
F.  The PNA Should Seek to Secure a General Assembly Resolution 
Recognizing the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and 
Government of the Palestinian State  
The pitch to the United Nations is more complicated.  The U.N. Security 
Council is initially seized of the matter and essentially makes a 
recommendation to the U.N. General Assembly whether a state should be 
recognized.512  The problem here is that one of the permanent members can 
exercise the veto power.513  Still it may be of some value to have a General 
Assembly vote on a recommendation to the Security Council that upon its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law the Palestinian claim to statehood is 
well founded.  It should also be noted that Resolution 181 of the General 
Assembly stipulated that the partition envisioned the creation of an “Arab 
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State.”514  Technically, General Assembly Resolutions are not binding.515  
However, the target audience of this Resolution assumed that it was a legally 
binding instrument.516  The Israelis acted on this Resolution to declare their 
independent status and to regard the borders as the legal territorial boundary.  
When the Palestinians present their case for recognition and statehood, it 
would seem to be that they are simply asking for a reaffirmation of a 
preexistent General Assembly Resolution that appears to be the juridical 
standard in which Israel declared its sovereign independence.  Presumably 
therefore the recognition here is simply a reaffirmation of Resolution 181.  It 
is possible that the issue could be referred for confirmation to the Security 
Council.  Should that happen, it might be important for the Palestinian 
authority to seek in advance the support of the Council.  
G.  The PNA Should Seek to Secure Security Council Support  
Since the Pro-Israeli Lobby will be very active in securing the veto, the 
Palestinians and their allies would have to expend enormous resources to 
reach out to the U.S. government and, if possible, to reach out to liberal 
Jewish groups in the United States, in order to nullify the dominating role of 
AIPAC and others.  If the wider assessment is that these recent Israeli moves 
were designed to derail the U.S.-sponsored peace talks,517 they provide a 
greater incentive for the recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state.  
Additionally it would help the Palestinian effort to influence U.S. policy and 
the liberal Jewish lobby groups in the U.S. if it were to secure the support of 
the complex groups and perspectives in Israeli society.  There is a very 
powerful peace lobby in Israel.  Their support will be critical.  There is a 
vigorous and courageous human rights constituency in Israel and their voices 
would carry weight with the U.S. and with some Jewish lobby groups in the 
U.S.  It would also be of value for the PA to seek the support of liberal and 
labor elements in the Knesset.  This too would be useful in terms of 
solidifying public opinion behind their cause.      
One of the strident Likud-supporting lobby groups in the United States 
has already been aggressively working to get the U.S. government to 
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exercise the veto in the Security Council over Palestinian statehood.518  This 
suggests that an enormous amount of political work must be done to ensure 
that the U.S. does not exercise the veto and, at the minimum, remains 
neutral.  Such a strategy must generate some support inside the United States 
for the recognition of the Palestinian state.  We suspect that a part of that 
argument could be that it is not for the Netanyahu government to decide to 
block Palestinian statehood—this is matter for the international community.  
In this sense, one hopes that, for salvaging the peace process, the United 
States will not exercise its veto in such circumstances. 
H.  The PA Should Develop a Strategy to Move Around a U.S. Veto of 
Security Council Recognition of Palestinian Statehood and Sovereignty 
Under International Law 
Given the furious lobby activity by the pro-ultranationalist lobbyists, 
there is a strong possibility that the United States will veto any resolution 
before the Security Council providing statehood for the Palestinian people.  
In general, a veto normally means that the matter is concluded before the 
United Nations.519  However, there is a little-used procedure that was 
invented by the United States to develop a procedure to get around the 
exercise of a Security Council veto, if that veto undermined the importance 
of protecting international peace and security.  This procedure became 
known as the “Uniting for Peace Resolution.”520   
It was used when the Security Council, because of a veto, was incapable 
of performing its primary functions concerning the protection and promotion 
of international peace and security.521  This Resolution assumed that, since 
the problem relating to peace and security remained, there was a residual 
competence in the U.N. General Assembly to pass a Resolution by a 
supermajority, permitting U.N. action to be taken in the protection of 
international peace and security.522  In this context, the PA’s allies in the 
General Assembly could certainly make the case that the recognition of 
Palestinian statehood is a major factor in promoting international peace and 
security in the region.  Moreover, the interminable state of occupancy, which 
Security Council Resolution 242523 stipulates must be ended, gives additional 
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recognition to the importance that recognition of statehood for the 
Palestinian people has for peace and security.  Judging from the support 
already generated for the recognition of statehood as an indispensible step to 
resolving conflict and crisis in the region, there should be a greater than 
supermajority that may be used to overcome a U.S. veto in the Security 
Council.  This interpretative innovation to the U.N. Charter was—it should 
be recalled—a U.S. initiative.  This initiative was upheld by the International 
Court of Justice in its advisory judgment of The Expenses Case.524  If it is 
clear that there already is a supermajority to support the use of the “Uniting 
for Peace” Resolution to overcome the exercise of a U.S. veto, the U.S. 
Administration may be less enthusiastic about either the exercise of the veto, 
or the idea that the veto will be surmounted by the overwhelming strength of 
international public opinion.  In short, the United States, to avoid the 
embarrassment of complete isolation and defeat, may simply abstain in the 
U.N. Security Council regarding this issue. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
Finally, we wish to reassert that we assign a positive value judgment to 
being pro human rights and essential justice for all.  As a jurist and a human 
rights practitioner, my ultimate loyalty lies not with any state, organization, 
or even community, but instead with the values of peace, wellbeing, and 
freedom from fear for all individuals.  From this perspective, my position is 
that the recognition of the state of Palestine is essential for achieving the 
wider realization of these values, for the people of Palestine, for the people 
of Israel, and even for the people of the United States.  It is possible that 
there are other possible futures for Israel and Palestine.  We have however 
sought to limit the scope of the spectrum so as to reduce the complexity of an 
already complex problem.   
The issue of the U.N. role in the status of Palestinian claims to self-
determination, statehood and sovereignty is a matter under furious debate 
and aggressive diplomacy in the U.N.  President Obama, in his speech before 
the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2011,525 sought to 
framed U.S. foreign policy in terms that justified its diplomatic efforts to 
block the issue from coming before the U.N. at all and with a clear 
implication that if it came before the Security Council the U.S. would 
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exercise its veto to block a decision on Palestinian sovereignty and 
statehood.526  This decision however, acknowledges that the U.S. supports a 
two-state solution as a realistic basis for sustainable peace.  Moreover, it 
stresses that Israeli security issues still remain a stumbling block to progress.  
It also acknowledges that the Palestinians “deserve to know the territorial 
basis of their state.”527  Given the clarity of these issues the President also 
insists that these issues cannot be resolve with support from outside 
negotiating parties such as The Quartet on the Middle East, which includes 
the United Nations, United States, European Union and Russia.528  It is 
hoped that the President statement is not an inadvertent repudiation of the 
Quartet process, because it represents the major security players in the global 
environment.  The problem with the negotiations is to a large extent the 
significant shift in Israeli politics toward the right, and an unwillingness of 
the President to acknowledge that the new right-wing coalition in Israel is a 
reluctant negotiator.  Indeed, everyone knows that settlement activity should 
at least cease during active negotiations.  This indeed was acknowledged by 
the Obama administration.  It was rejected by Netanyahu, who knew that this 
was a deal breaker to continuing negotiations.  In effect, the U.S. role as an 
honest broker was essentially castrated and the U.S. was left diplomatically 
humiliated.529  The Israeli right wing agenda also included a demand that 
Palestine and presumably the Quartet should recognize that Israel is not a 
State based on secular rights and duties if citizenship but makes rights turn 
on ethnicity.530  This is another deal breaker because there are a million plus 
Israeli citizens who would be excluded from rights because they do not have 
the right ethnic pedigree.  This is another unnecessary stumbling block and 
indeed is a complete repudiation of the Israeli Declaration of Independence.  
Given the pluralistic nature of the United States and its struggle to repudiate 
discrimination based on race or ethnicity it is surprising that a black 
President with a multi-ethnic pedigree would not call Mr. Netanyahu on this 
issue.  Additionally, the Camp David Accords, negotiated by President 
Jimmy Carter, recognize Security Council resolutions which delimit Israeli 
and Palestinian boundaries.531  The United States voted for these 
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resolutions.532  Israel negotiated the Camp David Accords on the basis of 
these resolutions.533  It is a real pity and a failure if U.S. diplomacy not to 
recognize its role in the Security Council and at Camp David on the issue of 
boundaries.  Finally, the President obscures the fact that the hidden subtext 
that suggests only agreement between the parties is the exclusive basis for 
moving forward essentially gives the Israeli right wing an indefinite veto 
over any otherwise legitimate international claim to self-determination, 
statehood and sovereignty.  The Oslo Accords can never be read to suggest 
that they set in motion a process of negotiation that might continue in a 
timeless manner.  Regrettably, the President’s rhetoric about Palestinian and 
Israeli interests seems to represent only a shallow sense of what as a State the 
interests of Israel are, the interests of the Palestinians might be, and the 
national vital interests of the United States in speeding up negotiations 
toward a viable and sustainable conclusion.  In this sense Obama’s speech is 
devoid of strategic vision, tactical specificity or indeed a genuine 
understanding of the interplay of national interests, regional interests and 
fundamental global values.                   
We hope that this analysis of the legal effects of past practice and facts on 
the ground, in combination with policy suggestions for recognition of the 
state of Palestine, offers a shared backdrop against which the deliberations of 
Palestinians and Israelis (as well as the global community) may continue 
toward the universal goals of achieving self-determination, independent 
stability, widespread peace, and essential dignity. 
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